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In the paradigmatic case of conscientious objection, the objector claims that 
his religion forbids him from actively participating in a wrong (for example, by 
fighting in a war). In the religious challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s employer 
mandate, on the other hand, employers claim that their religious convictions forbid 
them from merely subsidizing insurance through which their employees might 
commit a wrong (for example, by using contraception). The understanding of com-
plicity underpinning these challenges is vastly more expansive than the standard 
that legal doctrine or moral theory contemplates. Courts routinely reject claims of 
conscientious objection to taxes that fund military initiatives or to university fees 
that support abortion services. In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court took 
the corporate owners at their word: the mere fact that Hobby Lobby believed that it 
would be complicit, no matter how idiosyncratic its belief, sufficed to qualify it for 
an exemption. In this way, the Court made elements of an employee’s health-care 
package the “boss’s business” (to borrow from the nickname of the Democrats’ pro-
posed bill to overturn Hobby Lobby). 
Much of the critical reaction to Hobby Lobby focuses on the issue of corporate 
rights of religious freedom. Yet this issue is a red herring. The deeper concerns that 
Hobby Lobby raises—about whether employers may now refuse, on religious 
grounds, to subsidize other forms of health coverage (for example, blood transfu-
sions or vaccinations) or to serve customers whose lifestyles they deplore (for exam-
ple, gays and lesbians)—do not turn on the organizational form that the employer 
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has adopted. Instead, the more significant issue goes to our understanding of com-
plicity: When is it reasonable for an employer (for-profit or nonprofit, corporate or 
individual) to think itself complicit in the conduct of its employees or customers? 
And when is a reasonable claim of complicity compelling enough to warrant an 
accommodation, especially when that accommodation would impose costs on third 
parties? 
Hobby Lobby does not provide the proper guidance for answering these ques-
tions, and no wonder: as I argue here, the concept of complicity pervading the 
treatment of conscientious objection in the law is murky and misleading, and it 
often yields unjust results. This Article offers the guidance that the doctrine does 
not. To that end, it exposes the flaws in the understandings of complicity evident in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby, as well as in Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act cases more generally. It then seeks to disaggregate the el-
ements of a complicity claim and to identify which of these elements deserves to be 
treated deferentially. 
Deference, however, is not decisive. The Article’s second ambition is to expose 
an oversight in the law’s treatment of conscientious objection—namely, its failure 
to inquire into how a religious accommodation will affect third parties. Exemption 
opponents contend that the law already requires courts to deny an accommodation 
when the accommodation would impose substantial burdens on third parties. I be-
lieve that these opponents have a mistaken and overly sanguine view of the protec-
tion that the doctrine currently affords. I end the Article by proposing a revised 
balancing test—one that reflects a far more nuanced grasp of what is at stake for 
the objector while yielding far more just outcomes for third parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc,1 the Supreme Court 
faced a plea for an exemption from the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act2 (ACA) based on an unusually broad concep-
tion of complicity: Hobby Lobby, a closely held for-profit corpora-
tion, claimed that it would be participating in a wrong merely by 
subsidizing insurance through which its employees might access 
contraception that might destroy embryos.3 The understanding 
of complicity underpinning this claim is vastly more expansive 
than that which standard legal doctrine or moral theory  
contemplates.4 As such, the Court could have rejected Hobby 
Lobby’s claim—and, in doing so, denied it an exemption from the 
so-called contraceptive mandate5—on the ground that Hobby 
Lobby’s connection to the conduct it found objectionable was too 
 
 1 134 S Ct 2751 (2014).  
 2 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 3 See Aaron E. Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access to Birth Con-
trol (NY Times, June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E2WP-LJTN (describing the 
medical consensus that the possibility of the challenged methods of contraception involv-
ing embryo destruction is highly speculative and improbable). See also George J. Annas, 
Theodore W. Ruger, and Jennifer Prah Ruger, Money, Sex, and Religion — the Supreme 
Court’s ACA Sequel, 371 New Eng J Med 862, 862 (2014) (“[I]n the opinion of medical 
experts, the four methods of contraception under scrutiny do not induce abortion; rather, 
they prevent abortion by preventing pregnancy.”); notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Part II. 
 5 See ACA § 1001(5), 124 Stat at 131, codified at 42 USC § 300gg-13(a)(4). I join 
Professor Marty Lederman and others in thinking that the term “mandate” is misleading 
here. See Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—There Is No “Employer Mandate” 
(Balkinization, Dec 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2XLJ-5PEN. See also Micah 
Schwartzman, Rich Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment 
Clause: Gedicks and the Government (Balkinization, Jan 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6D4J-JDMQ.  
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tenuous to be cognizable. Courts have proceeded in just this way 
in countless other cases in which, say, taxpayers have lodged 
conscientious objections to subsidizing military spending,6 or 
students have lodged conscientious objections to paying univer-
sity fees that cover medical services providing abortion counsel-
ing.7 Instead, the Court took Hobby Lobby at its word: the mere 
fact that Hobby Lobby believed that it would be complicit, no 
matter how idiosyncratic its belief, sufficed to qualify it for an 
exemption.8 In a similar vein, the Court proceeded with grand 
deference in an order that it issued just three days after render-
ing its Hobby Lobby decision.9 There, the Court acceded to 
Wheaton College’s request for a preliminary injunction exempt-
ing it not from having to cover its employees’ contraception 
 
 6 See, for example, United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens concur-
ring) (“[T]here is virtually no room for a ‘constitutionally required exemption’ on reli-
gious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neutral in its general application.”); 
Michelle O’Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly What Rights Does It 
“Restore” in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 Ariz St L J 321, 329 (2004) (“Aside from the li-
censing tax cases . . . the Supreme Court never has held that the Free Exercise Clause 
requires the government to grant a person an exemption from a generally applicable, 
neutral tax law.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 
1999 Wis L Rev 939, 971 (surveying cases and concluding that “[e]ach has held that . . . 
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] . . . does not require the income tax laws to ac-
commodate religious beliefs, specifically those of conscientious objectors to war”). See  
also notes 161–62 (collecting cases in which courts have rejected claims of conscientious 
objection to taxes aimed at funding initiatives that the taxpayer opposes).  
 7 See, for example, Goehring v Brophy, 94 F3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir 1996), overruled 
on other grounds by City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) (holding that the use of 
university registration fees to fund a student health insurance plan that included abor-
tion coverage did not substantially burden the free exercise rights of students who ob-
jected to abortion on religious grounds, in part because the “plaintiffs [were] not required 
to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of abortion  
services”); Erzinger v Regents of University of California, 187 Cal Rptr 164, 166–68 (Cal 
App 1982). 
 8 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778 (noting that federal courts will not address 
whether a religious belief asserted in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) case 
is reasonable). Hobby Lobby in fact consolidated two cases involving claims of conscien-
tious objection on the parts of three employers. In the first case, an appeal from the 
Tenth Circuit, two closely held corporations owned by the Green family—Hobby Lobby, a 
chain of craft stores, and Mardel, a publisher of Christian texts—challenged the contra-
ceptive mandate and won. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v Sebelius, 723 F3d 
1114 (10th Cir 2013). In the second case, an appeal from the Third Circuit, Conestoga 
Wood, a closely held corporation owned by the Hahn family that manufactures kitchen 
cabinets, also challenged the contraceptive mandate but lost. See generally Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp v Secretary of United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, 724 F3d 377 (3d Cir 2013). For ease of exposition, I refer in the text only to 
Hobby Lobby, though everything I say about that company applies to Mardel and  
Conestoga as well, unless otherwise indicated. 
 9 See generally Wheaton College v Burwell, 134 S Ct 2806 (2014).  
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costs—the government had already released Wheaton from the 
contraceptive mandate10—but from having to fill out the form 
that would formalize its exemption.11 Thus, the mere fact that 
Wheaton College believed that filling out the form would make it 
complicit in contraceptive coverage was sufficient to qualify it, 
too—at least preliminarily—for an exemption.12 
These cases suggest that we have entered an era of unstint-
ing deference to religious belief, often based on fantastical con-
ceptions of complicity exercised at the expense of third parties 
who incur a burden in light of an accommodation obtained by 
the religious adherent. As Professor Sanford Levinson puts it, 
“‘Because this is the way I feel’ seems to be a conclusive  
 
 10 The original accommodation procedure required a nonprofit to complete a form 
certifying that it is a religious nonprofit that opposes contraception. See 45 CFR 
§ 147.131(b)(4). The nonprofit had to then submit that form to its third-party  
administrator (TPA), which would then be on notice that it had to provide contraception 
in the nonprofit’s stead. See 29 CFR § 2590.715-2713A(a)(b). For the form itself, see 
EBSA Form 700— Certification (Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5JX5-8SBD. 
 In response to the Wheaton College order, the Obama administration revised the ac-
commodation procedure. The new procedure permits a religious nonprofit to register its 
objection directly with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) instead of 
with its TPA. It is then HHS’s responsibility to notify the TPA. See Department of the 
Treasury, Department of Labor, and Department of Health and Human Services, Cover-
age of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed Reg 51092, 
51094–95 (2014); Department of the Treasury, Department of Labor, and Department of 
Health and Human Services, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Afford-
able Care Act, 80 Fed Reg 41318, 41323 (2015); 29 CFR § 2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B). I 
discuss the merits of the challenges to the old and new procedures in note 91. 
 11 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2807. In a Seventh Circuit case raising an almost 
identical challenge, Judge Richard Posner emphasized the “novelty” of the claim at issue 
in this pithy way: the plaintiff asked “not for the exemption, which it ha[d], but for the 
right to have it without having to ask for it.” University of Notre Dame v Sebelius, 743 
F3d 547, 557 (7th Cir 2014). 
 12 Seven of the eight federal appellate courts to hear appeals in which religious 
nonprofits have objected to the filing requirement have rejected the nonprofits’ claims, 
stating that it is the ACA itself, and not the filing of the form, that triggers coverage for 
contraceptive use. See, for example, Priests for Life v United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, 772 F3d 229, 252–53 (DC Cir 2014), cert granted, 2015 WL 
6759640 (US). See also Challenges to the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Rule (ACLU, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/24GF-EMFU (providing a list of citations to the deci-
sions addressing religious challenges to the accommodation). In the most recent of these 
cases, however, the Eighth Circuit affirmed lower court orders granting injunctive relief 
to religious organizations, holding that the organizations deserved to prevail in their 
challenges to the accommodation procedures. See Dordt College v Burwell, 2015 WL 
5449504, *2 (8th Cir); Sharpe Holdings, Inc v United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2015 WL 5449491, *13 (8th Cir). In both cases, the Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the nonprofits that the filing of the form imposed a substantial burden on 
the nonprofits’ religious exercise, and it found that the government’s interest, while 
compelling, could be served by a less-restrictive means.  
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argument in the religio[us] realm.”13 Invocations of religion, that 
is, threaten to function as trumps,14 foreclosing legal interven-
tion for everything from discrimination against gays and lesbi-
ans to refusals to cover lifesaving care. Hobby Lobby, then, 
would have religion reign supreme.15 
 
 13 Sandy Levinson, Justice Ginsburg’s Inexplicable First Two Pages (Balkinization, 
June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H35H-RX4S.  
 14 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously xi (Harvard 1977) (“Individual 
rights are political trumps held by individuals.”); Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in 
Jeremy Waldron, ed, Theories of Rights 153, 153 (Oxford 1984). For a critical reaction to 
the conception of rights as trumps, focusing especially on the conception’s atomistic  
implications, see, for example, Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in 
Search of a Public Philosophy 25–26 (Belknap 1996); Charles Taylor, Alternative Fu-
tures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada, in Alan 
Cairns and Cynthia Williams, eds, Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada 
183, 209 (Toronto 1985) (describing the rights model as identifying “the dignity of the 
free agent . . . more with the bearer of rights than with the citizen participator”); Richard 
H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Consti-
tutionalism, 27 J Legal Stud 725, 729 (1998); Robin West, Rights, Harms, and Duties: A 
Response to Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 BU L Rev 819, 819 (2010). 
 15 I focus here largely on religiously based claims of conscientious objection because 
Hobby Lobby was decided under a statute protecting religious freedom. See note 20 and 
accompanying text (describing RFRA). With that said, I note that conscience can be  
informed by religious as well as secular moral convictions, and some scholars argue that 
the law should be equally hospitable to both. See, for example, Sandel, Democracy’s Dis-
content at 55 (cited in note 14); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Reli-
gious Freedom and the Constitution 51–77 (Harvard 2007). For arguments on the other 
side, see, for example, Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 
Quinnipiac L Rev 257, 301 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out 
Religion, 50 DePaul L Rev 1, 3 (2000). See also United States v Seeger, 380 US 163, 164–
66 (1965) (accommodating nonreligious pacifistic objections to the draft because they 
played the same role in their bearers’ lives that religious convictions play for religious 
pacifists); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195, 
197 (1992) (arguing that each of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
entails protections for religious freedom as well as freedom from religion). For an espe-
cially searching inquiry into whether religion is special, see Micah Schwartzman, What 
If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U Chi L Rev 1351, 1353 (2012). And for the claim that con-
science, whether informed by religious or secular precepts, is both over- and underinclusive 
when it comes to identifying the set of legal requirements from which one should be able 
to claim an exemption, see Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Re-
ligious Exemptions, 15 Legal Theory 215, 221–24 (2009). 
 Shortly before this Article went to press, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia became the first court to grant an exemption from the contraceptive 
mandate on the basis of secular objections to the coverage of so-called abortifacients. See 
March for Life v Burwell, 2015 WL 5139099, *12 (DDC). March for Life is a nonreligious 
nonprofit dedicated to advancing pro-life causes. On that basis, the district court found 
the organization’s objections no less sincerely or strongly held than those of a religious 
nonprofit, and the court found the government’s willingness to accommodate only reli-
gious nonprofits but not secular ones a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id at *5–6. 
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This unprecedented reverence for religious freedom is the 
decision’s key failing and the aspect of the doctrine most in need 
of interrogation and rectification. It is appropriate, then, that 
the bill that Democrats have proposed to overturn Hobby Lobby 
has been given the nickname “Not My Boss’s Business Act.”16 
The central question in Hobby Lobby’s inevitable progeny should 
be: “When is a decision about health-care coverage an employer’s 
business?” or, more perspicuously, “When does an employer have 
a strong-enough reason to think itself complicit in its employees’ 
health-care choices such that it should enjoy an exemption from 
having to subsidize those choices?” And because the Hobby  
Lobby decision has implications not just for health-care coverage 
but also for antidiscrimination laws—such as when a business 
seeks to deny service or employment to gays and lesbians17—the 
question of complicity should be cast more broadly still: “When 
may a business owner claim an exemption from a legal require-
ment that would connect him to conduct that he opposes on reli-
gious grounds?”18 Unfortunately, both the Hobby Lobby decision 
and the broader free exercise doctrine provide reason to doubt 
that courts will arrive at the right answers going forward. 
The doctrine at issue in these cases is based on the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 199319 (RFRA), which allows a 
religious adherent to claim an exemption from a neutral law of 
general applicability when that law imposes a “substantial bur-
den” on him and the government cannot show that the law aims 
to serve a “compelling interest” in the “least restrictive” way 
possible.20 The legal requirement at issue in Hobby Lobby fol-
 
 16 See Protect Women’s Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014, HR 5051, 
113th Cong, 2d Sess (July 9, 2014). See also Jake Lefferman, Dems Strike Back on Hobby 
Lobby Case with ‘Not My Boss’s Business Act’ (ABC News, July 9, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CVA6-QWK2. 
 17 See, for example, Michael Paulson and Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in  
Arizona Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays (NY Times, Feb 21, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E6HD-KZK3.  
 18 For a survey of some of the issues that might give rise to a clash between claims 
to religious freedom and legal protection for historically disfavored lifestyle choices, see 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes between Religion and the State, 53 BC L Rev 1417, 
1426–29 (2012). 
 19 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq. 
 20 The precise text of the relevant part of the statute is as follows:  
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance 
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lows from the ACA, which imposes an employer mandate:21 
businesses employing fifty or more full-time workers must pro-
vide health insurance,22 and this health insurance must include 
preventive care for women.23 Federal rules promulgated in light 
of the ACA and developed in consultation with the Institute of 
Medicine identify precisely which kinds of preventive care em-
ployer health-care packages must offer. Among these is the so-
called contraceptive mandate: the rules dictate that all methods 
of FDA-approved contraception must be made available through 
the health plans offered by large employers.24 Employers that 
object on religious grounds to some or all forms of contraception 
have challenged the contraceptive mandate under RFRA, claim-
ing that it imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious ex-
ercise.25 In Hobby Lobby, the Court ruled for the first time that 
for-profit corporations can claim rights of religious freedom  
under RFRA, and it thus granted Hobby Lobby an exemption 
from having to provide the forms of contraception it opposed.26 
Much has been made of the corporate law implications of 
the decision.27 These are important questions in their own right, 
 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
42 USC § 2000bb-1(a)–(b). RFRA has been deemed “both a rule of interpretation” and 
“an exercise of general legislative supervision over federal agencies, enacted pursuant to 
each of the federal powers that gives rise to legislation or agencies in the first place.” 
Douglas Laycock and Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 73 Tex L Rev 209, 211 (1994). As such, this “super-statute” can constrain the operation 
of any federal legislation that fails RFRA’s test. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs 
through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 Mont L Rev 249, 253 (1995). 
 21 See Sandhya Somashekhar, As Health-Care Law’s Employer Mandate Nears, 
Firms Cut Worker Hours, Struggle with Logistics (Wash Post, June 23, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/WKK6-GXZM. 
 22 Other Information about the Health Care Law for Small Businesses (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services), archived at http://perma.cc/B2JE-AX2J. 
 23 42 USC § 300gg-13.  
 24 See 80 Fed Reg at 41318 (cited in note 10). 
 25 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty maintains a list of the contraceptive-
mandate challenges. See HHS Mandate Information Central (The Becket Fund for Reli-
gious Liberty), archived at http://perma.cc/3A7A-SLH6. As of October 1, 2015, there have 
been 105 cases filed, with “victories” (mostly preliminary injunctions) for plaintiffs in 71 
of them. See id. 
 26 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2768, 2784. 
 27 I address these implications in Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Improprie-
ty: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 Harv Bus L 
Rev 173 (2015). See also generally Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Reli-
gious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 Geo Mason L Rev 59 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood, 100 Va L Rev Online 1 (2014); Eric Orts, The Legal and Social Ontology of the 
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but Hobby Lobby’s deeper significance—and the “parade of  
horribles” it threatens28—do not in fact turn on the employer’s 
organizational form.29 This is because the exemptions at issue in 
Hobby Lobby and those predicted to be sought in its wake would 
be troubling whether it was a corporation, a limited liability 
company, a partnership, or a sole proprietorship that was seek-
ing the accommodation.30 The cause for concern lies not so much 
with the extension of RFRA to for-profit entities, then, as with 
the doctrine itself, which grants exemptions so long as the reli-
gious adherent believes himself to be implicated in the conduct 
that his religion opposes, and no matter the costs that an ex-
emption imposes on others.31 
 
Firm (The Conglomerate, Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8HYG-2N7H; Micah 
Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, The New Law of Religion (Slate, 
July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PXN6-996V.  
 28 Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Unleash a ‘Parade of Horribles’? (Wharton School, 
July 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6PRH-JQGD. In September 2014, a district 
court judge relied on Hobby Lobby as precedent to relieve a Mormon from his obligation 
to testify in a case alleging that the Church had used child labor. Shadee Ashtari, Judge 
Cites Hobby Lobby to Excuse Fundamentalist Mormon from Child Labor Testimony 
(Huffington Post, Sept 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7BT7-JRZ9. Commenting 
on the case, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky said, “I fear it is just the start of cases of people 
claiming religious exemptions from general laws.” Id. See also Douglas NeJaime and  
Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 Yale L J 2516, 2572–74 (2015) (providing examples of the ways in which  
opponents of gay rights have wielded Hobby Lobby to shirk antidiscrimination measures 
aimed at protecting gays and lesbians); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of 
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev 933, 947 (1989) (“Behind every 
free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, 
and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious 
deviants of every stripe.”). 
 29 For a narrower argument to this effect, see generally Amy Sepinwall, Can a Cor-
poration Have a Conscience? (Wash Post, Mar 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D2WR-9563 (“[T]hose who oppose Hobby Lobby’s stance do so because 
they want to ensure that women have adequate access to reproductive health care. They 
would object to efforts to circumvent the contraceptive mandate whether it was a corpo-
ration or an individual business owner who sought an exemption.”). 
 30 See generally, for example, Complaint, Wieland v United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, Civil Action No 13-01577 (ED Mo filed Aug 14, 2013) 
(available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 4618865) (stating the claims made on behalf of indi-
vidual insurance subscribers objecting to insurance premiums that partly subsidize con-
traception for other subscribers to the same insurance plan). For a survey of the different 
kinds of business forms currently available, see Eric W. Orts, Business Persons: A Legal 
Theory of the Firm 175–222 (Oxford 2013). 
 31 See Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 689 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting), cert 
denied, 134 S Ct 2903 (2014) (noting that the majority’s holding, which exempted two 
for-profit businesses from the contraceptive mandate, “has the potential to reach far be-
yond contraception and to invite employers to seek exemptions from any number of  
federally-mandated employee benefits to which an employer might object on religious 
grounds”). 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
1906  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1897 
   
Hobby Lobby and its anticipated progeny fit into a larger 
debate about the place of religious freedom in public life,32 a de-
bate that “continues to divide and trouble the legal system.”33 
But the case and its likely successors also raise distinct ques-
tions about the appropriate scope of claims of complicity. In par-
ticular, these cases invite us to determine when we ought to  
accede to the religious adherent’s belief that abiding by a law of 
general applicability makes him complicit in conduct contrary to 
his religion. While questions about the general bounds of reli-
gious freedom have received ample attention,34 questions about 
complicity remain among the “the most serious and difficult” in 
this area because they raise “fundamental questions about the 
nature of collective responsibility in a democratic society.”35  
This Article aims to make progress on these questions, en-
gaging with religious objections to legal requirements that com-
pel the adherent to contribute to conduct by others that his  
religion opposes. To that end, this Article seeks to diagnose and 
then remedy two problems afflicting the doctrine and scholar-
ship around conscientious objection—first, the impoverished un-
derstanding of complicity therein, and second, the near neglect 
of third-party effects. As to the first problem, the doctrine does 
not dictate the scope of cognizable complicity claims: it offers too 
little guidance as to when courts should heed a claim that some 
legal requirement makes the religious adherent morally respon-
sible for conduct to which the religious adherent objects. One 
sees evidence of this problem in the understandings of complici-
ty contained in both the majority opinion and the principal dis-
sent in Hobby Lobby,36 in the doctrine predating Hobby Lobby, 
and in the RFRA scholarship more generally. As we shall see, 
courts, as well as scholars, operate with understandings of  
 
 32 As Professor Michael W. McConnell put it, “[D]oes the freedom of religious exer-
cise . . . require the government, in the absence of a sufficiently compelling need, to grant 
exemptions from legal duties that conflict with religious obligations? Or does this free-
dom guarantee only that religious believers will be governed by equal laws, without dis-
crimination or preference?” Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1411 (1990). 
 33 Id.  
 34 See generally, for example, Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton 
2013); McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev 1409 (cited in note 32); Sullivan, 59 U Chi L Rev 195 
(cited in note 15); Koppelman, 15 Legal Theory 215 (cited in note 15). 
 35 Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va L Rev 317, 376 (2011). 
 36 I focus principally on Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, although I make passing reference to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
concurrence. 
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complicity that are murky, undertheorized, and at times just 
plain wrong.37 
The doctrine regarding conscientious objection is afflicted by 
a second problem as well, as it does not take third-party inter-
ests into account except to the extent that they align with the 
government’s interest in imposing the legal requirement. As 
such, women’s interests in easy access to the full spectrum of the 
ACA-approved contraceptive methods are factored into the doc-
trine’s balancing test only if the government takes these inter-
ests to be compelling.38 So too with gays’ and lesbians’ interests 
in equal treatment in the commercial sphere. The dissent was 
sensitive to this concern, faulting the majority in large part be-
cause the majority accorded an exemption without due regard 
for the effect of the exemption on the “thousands of women em-
ployed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons 
those corporations employ.”39 But the doctrine does not support 
the dissent’s complaint. Instead, the relevant precedents treat 
third-party interests as merely tangential to the inquiry about 
whether to accommodate the religious believer’s objection to the 
legal requirement with which he disagrees. What matters, ac-
cording to the doctrine, is the government’s interest in the con-
tested regulation. But there is no reason to think that the gov-
ernment’s interest overlaps with the interests of the third 
parties who would incur a burden were the religious objector to 
receive an exemption.40 As such, the government is poorly placed 
to defend the interests of third parties in the face of a complaint 
about governmental infringement of religious freedom. And yet 
the doctrine’s failure here has escaped the notice of virtually all 
commentators,41 who contend either that third parties suffer no 
 
 37 See Part III.A–B. 
 38 See Part IV.A–B. 
 39 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting). See also id at 2801 (Ginsburg 
dissenting) (“No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based 
exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to others—here, the very persons 
the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect.”). 
 40 I provide an example to this effect in Part IV.B. 
 41 But see Frederick Mark Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why 
an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 Vand L Rev 
En Banc 51, 65 (2014) (“The most depressing aspect of discussions surrounding the  
Hobby Lobby litigation is the total failure to acknowledge the women who would be 
harmed by RFRA exemptions from the Mandate.”). Professor Alan E. Garfield does not 
fault the doctrine for overlooking women’s interests, but he does contend that the doc-
trine on religious freedom underdetermines the issues here. Given the indeterminacy, 
and assuming that women’s interests are more important than those of the religious ob-
jectors, Garfield concludes that the exemption should be denied. Alan E. Garfield, The 
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cognizable harm from an exemption42 or else that the doctrine 
really does factor in third-party costs.43 
In short, the question whether contraception (or blood trans-
fusions, or sexual orientation, for that matter) is a “boss’s busi-
ness” is one that the doctrine is ill equipped to answer, both be-
cause it lacks a well-founded theory of complicity and because it 
does not adequately consider how the boss’s interests should in-
teract with those of the employees or potential customers whom 
the boss’s interests affect. The purpose of this Article is to pro-
vide the missing theoretical and doctrinal pieces in a way that 
leads to much more justifiable, and just, results. The revised 
doctrine at which I arrive comes out in favor of Hobby Lobby, 
but it avoids the troubling implications to which the Hobby  
Lobby decision could give rise, if unchecked. 
More specifically, I argue that we should treat complicity 
claims with great deference: I hope to show that we are, in many 
cases, without the moral clarity or authority to challenge some-
one’s belief that the conduct legally required of him would make 
him complicit in what he perceives as a wrong. Yet if we are re-
stricted in challenging the truth of his assertion of complicity, 
then it becomes especially important to be able to assess his ob-
jection on the basis of the cost that honoring it would impose on 
others. Thus, I contend that the smaller the burden of a reli-
gious exemption on third parties, the more readily courts should 
grant the requested exemption. By the same token, the greater 
the burden that a conscience-based exemption would impose on 
third parties, the less willing courts should be to accede to the 
 
Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 Colum L Rev Sidebar 
1, 22–23 (2014). For an opposing viewpoint, see Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is 
a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 Drake L Rev 
433, 470–74 (2014) (noting that the case law sometimes adverts to third-party interests, 
but nonetheless concluding that, “generally speaking, the legal standards do not have a 
consistent way of taking account of these impacts”). 
 42 See, for example, Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim That Exemptions from the 
Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause (Law Professor Blogs Network, Dec 5, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8GBW-T57U. 
 43 See, for example, Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 54–56 (cit-
ed in note 41); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, The Estab-
lishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate (Balkinization, Nov 27, 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/665Q-EE23; Micah Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and 
Religion and Arguing off the Wall (Slate, Nov 26, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q96D-4AS8; Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA 
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of 
Religion, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev 343, 356–72 (2014). 
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religious objector’s request. I end the Article with a proposal for 
a revised balancing test that captures this interplay. 
Part I begins with a critical assessment of the understand-
ings of complicity in both the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Hobby Lobby. I argue that the majority was overly deferential 
to the religious believer’s assertions of complicity, while the dis-
sent operated with a conception of complicity that was too strin-
gent. Looming over both positions is a disagreement about the 
role that courts may play in evaluating complicity claims. A sub-
sidiary aim of Part I is to tease apart what kinds of claims—
moral, empirical, or relational—courts must treat deferentially 
out of respect for religion. 
In Parts II and III, I draw out and critique the conception of 
complicity immanent in the law. The aim here is twofold: First, I 
seek to demonstrate that, had the Court relied on that concep-
tion rather than deferring to the more expansive one underpin-
ning Hobby Lobby’s claims, the Court would have denied Hobby 
Lobby an exemption. The Court’s own precedents, that is, would 
have found Hobby Lobby to be too tenuously connected to the 
conduct that it opposes to give its claim of complicity credence, 
as I aim to show in Part II.44 But I also argue, in Part III, that 
the law’s understanding of complicity is not unassailable. In 
particular, I aim to establish that considerations of proximity 
play too prominent a role in complicity determinations and that 
proximity is neither a reliable nor always a compelling guide 
when it comes to judging whether someone has reason to feel 
implicated in conduct that he deems wrong. I argue that proxim-
ity is given this prominence because we tend to feel more impli-
cated in conduct to which we bear a closer causal relation, 
whether or not we are in fact more complicit. In other words, 
proximity tracks a subjective sense of complicity. But if what 
matters is one’s subjective sense, then there is no reason to priv-
ilege the law’s conception of complicity over that of the religious 
objector when the religious objector happens to feel complicit in 
a greater range of conduct than the standard legal account con-
templates. I conclude then that courts should, in general, take 
claims of complicity at face value, at least when they do not rest 
on factual errors. 
 
 44 See Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 
Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L 303, 329–30 (2014). 
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That conclusion does not automatically entail that the reli-
gious objector is entitled to an exemption, however. For even 
while courts should in general treat as true the religious adher-
ent’s claim of complicity, they must still consider whether acced-
ing to a request for an accommodation would impose undue bur-
dens on third parties. In Part IV, I argue (pace Ginsburg’s 
dissent) that the doctrine does not currently mandate the con-
sideration of third-party costs and that this oversight is deeply 
problematic. I then propose a revision to the test for religious ac-
commodations that aims to include third-party considerations. I 
conclude with some personal reflections. 
A note about terminology before proceeding: I frame the is-
sues here in reference to a business’s rights of conscience or reli-
gious freedom, or to those of its owners. I do not mean to imply 
that the business itself, whether or not it is incorporated, can 
exercise religion in its own right or have its own conscience. In-
deed, elsewhere I argue that it cannot.45 Instead, I use the term 
“business” as a shorthand for “the members of the business who 
have reason to feel implicated in its acts.” This is in keeping 
with Hobby Lobby, which grounds its extension of RFRA rights 
to the corporation in the free exercise rights of the corporation’s 
individual members.46 
 
 45 See Sepinwall, 5 Harv Bus L Rev at 178–90 (cited in note 27). For a preview of 
some of these arguments, see Sepinwall, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience? (cited in 
note 29); Amy Sepinwall, Corporate RFRA Rights and Complicity (The Conglomerate, 
July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SU52-WVE7. See also Amy J. Sepinwall, 
Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate 
Crime, 63 Hastings L J 411, 428–30 (2012) (arguing that corporations are not persons 
and thus cannot bear moral responsibility); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seri-
ously, 98 Va L Rev 1501, 1540–55 (2012) (arguing that institutions do not possess a  
conscience). 
 46 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2768–72. I note that Hobby Lobby assumes, with-
out argument, that the relevant members consist of only the closely held corporation’s 
owners. Others have contested this assumption on the grounds that the company’s deci-
sions about the provision of health care might contravene the deeply held convictions of 
its employees and that employees too have reason to care about what the company does. 
See, for example, id at 2795 (Ginsburg dissenting); Korte, 735 F3d at 722 (Rovner dis-
senting); Orts, The Legal and Social Ontology of the Firm (cited in note 27) (“Rights of 
employees may be equal to those of owners and managers in this context.”); Sepper, 22 
Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 319 (cited in note 44) (“In the case of disagreeing share-
holders, whose beliefs matter? And what of employees who may not share the owners’ 
beliefs?”). But I do not seek to challenge this assumption here. Instead, I first assume 
that there is a set of members who have exclusive authority over the corporation’s acts 
and so have reason to care about how its acts redound to them. Second, I assume that 
these members are entitled to seek exemptions from legal requirements to which the 
corporation is otherwise subject by virtue of their own rights. I will refer to these mem-
bers as “owners,” but I use that term provisionally. Those who think that there are  
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I.  COMPLICITY AND DEFERENCE 
In this Part, I argue that the RFRA doctrine lends itself to 
confusion about the scope of permissible complicity claims be-
cause it requires the person seeking an exemption to demonstrate 
that a neutral law of general applicability imposes a “substan-
tial” burden on the religious believer47 and the question of 
when a burden becomes “substantial” is undertheorized and  
controversial.48 
In Part I.A, I begin with the Hobby Lobby owners’ claims in 
an effort to clarify what is at stake—morally, for them, and con-
ceptually, for the courts assessing these claims. To that end, I 
distinguish among three different bases for evaluating the truth 
of these claims—on moral, empirical, or relational grounds. I 
then turn to the conceptions of complicity advanced in the 
Court’s opinions. In Part I.B, I argue that the dissent accorded 
too little deference to the owners’ beliefs. By contrast, the major-
ity, as we shall see in Part I.C, was too solicitous, as it suggested 
that challenging the owners on any ground was beyond the com-
petence and prerogative of the Court. Part I.D returns to the 
three dimensions on which conscientious objections might be 
evaluated and addresses the extent of deference to be accorded 
to each one. 
A. Moral, Empirical, and Relational Elements of Complicity 
Claims 
The ACA’s contraceptive mandate requires coverage of all 
FDA-approved forms of contraception.49 Hobby Lobby objected to 
four of these methods, on the ground that they pose a risk of 
functioning as “abortifacients”—that is, drugs or devices that 
 
non-owning members who are entitled to press their rights through the corporate form 
may substitute for “owners” the generic name of these other constituents (for example, 
employees, creditors, and so forth). For accounts of ownership that reveal its complexity, 
see A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A  
Collaborative Work 107, 107–34 (Oxford 1961); Orts, Business Persons at 104–05 (cited 
in note 30). 
 47 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 48 See generally, for example, Steven D. Smith and Caroline Mala Corbin, Debate, 
The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U Pa L Rev Online 261 (2013) 
(staking opposite positions on how courts should think about the term “substantial” in 
ascertaining whether the burden on the religious adherent is “substantial”). 
 49 See 80 Fed Reg at 41318 (cited in note 10) (incorporating by reference the Health 
Resources and Services Administration’s guidelines on women’s preventive services). For 
these guidelines, see Preventive Care Benefits for Women (HHS), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4JD2-QGEM. 
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destroy embryos.50 The majority described Hobby Lobby’s con-
cerns about subsidizing these forms of contraception in this way:  
The owners of the businesses have [(1)] religious objections 
to abortion, and [(2)] according to their religious beliefs the 
four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients. 
[(3)] If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they be-
lieve they will be facilitating abortions.  
. . .  
[Doing so will connect them] to the destruction of an embryo 
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to 
provide the coverage.51 
Claim (1) is a moral claim: the owners believe (on religious 
grounds) that abortion is wrong. Moral claims assert proposi-
tions about right and wrong. Claim (2) is an empirical claim: the 
owners believe that four of the forms of contraceptive coverage 
that the ACA mandates work by aborting embryos. Claim (3) is 
a relational claim: the owners believe that complying with the 
HHS mandate—that is, “providing the coverage demanded by 
the HHS regulations”52—connects them to the conduct they 
deem wrong, or relates them to the wrong, in a way that would 
make them complicit.53 
All three of these claims are controversial, and many people 
would reject each one. Clearly, a good many people deny that 
abortion is wrong.54 A greater percentage still think that abor-
tion should be legal.55 Claim (2) is even more controversial, as 
the medical establishment firmly rejects the notion that any of 
the contested forms of contraception works by destroying an em-
bryo.56 Finally, given how remote an employer’s contribution is 
to his employees’ contraceptive choices, Hobby Lobby’s claim 
 
 50 See Cathy Lynn Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? Disputes over Birth Control 
Fuel Obamacare Fight (Wash Post, Jan 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P767-8SPN. 
 51 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2759, 2778. Note that the numbers in parentheses 
were added to the block quotation to ease the exposition that follows. 
 52 Id at 2778.  
 53 This third claim in fact contains both a moral element and a relational one. I 
elaborate on these elements in Part I.D. 
 54 See Lydia Saad, Americans Still Split along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines (Gallup, 
May 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9Y5-2W6R (reporting the results of a Gallup 
poll indicating that 39 percent of Americans think that abortion is “morally acceptable,” 
while 51 percent think that it is “morally wrong”). 
 55 See id (reporting on a contemporaneous poll in which 49 percent of Americans 
identified as pro-choice, while 45 percent identified as pro-life). 
 56 See notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
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that the contraceptive mandate connects it to the supposedly 
wrongful conduct flies in the face of the standard accounts of 
complicity in law and morality, as we shall see in Part II. 
In light of the idiosyncratic nature of Hobby Lobby’s views 
on the permissibility of using or subsidizing others’ use of these 
modes of contraception, the justices faced the difficult question 
of whose views should prevail. Should they defer to Hobby  
Lobby’s contention that it was complicit? Or was it within the 
Court’s purview to judge the merits of the moral, empirical, and 
relational predicates of that contention? As Part I.B demonstrates, 
the dissent took issue with the moral and relational bases of 
Hobby Lobby’s complicity claim; the majority, on the other hand, 
refused to consider the merits of any of them. 
B. Complicity as Intentional Participation 
The dissent in Hobby Lobby maintained that the Court may 
determine for itself whether the conscientious objector has rea-
son to believe himself complicit in the conduct he opposes, and 
that the locus for that determination is the substantial-burden 
prong of RFRA’s test.57 Other jurists and commentators agree.58 
They seize on the word “substantial” and contend that this word 
requires courts “to distinguish large or considerable burdens 
from minor or incidental ones.”59 Otherwise, “any honestly-
perceived burden on religion resulting from government action 
would suffice to make out a prima facie free exercise claim.”60 
Notwithstanding the semantic plausibility of the argument, 
however, it is far from clear that the doctrine’s treatment of the 
substantial-burden prong in fact contemplates an inquiry into 
whether the religious adherent is right to think himself complic-
it in the conduct his religion opposes, let alone an inquiry into 
whether he is rendered sufficiently complicit such that his bur-
den counts as “substantial.” Nor does Ginsburg make good on 
 
 57 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798–99 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 58 See, for example, Wheaton College v Burwell, 134 S Ct 2806, 2812 (2014)  
(Sotomayor dissenting) (“Not every sincerely felt ‘burden’ is a ‘substantial’ one, and it is 
for courts, not litigants, to identify which are.”); Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 708 (7th 
Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting), cert denied, 134 S Ct 2903 (2014). In her closing state-
ment in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online debate, Professor Caroline 
Corbin presages Justice Ginsburg’s contention that the term “substantial” means that 
not just any burden should count under RFRA. Smith and Corbin, Debate, 161 U Pa L 
Rev Online at 279 (cited in note 48). 
 59 Korte, 735 F3d at 708 (Rovner dissenting). 
 60 Id (Rovner dissenting). 
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her contention that judges enjoy a prerogative to assess the 
strength of complicity claims.61 If anything, in many cases the 
substantial-burden inquiry elides the question of complicity al-
together and focuses exclusively on the extent of the penalty the 
adherent would face were he to decline to follow the law.62 The 
burden, then, tracks the consequences of noncompliance with the 
challenged legal requirement, not the repercussions of compliance. 
The dissent in Hobby Lobby, however, was unperturbed, and 
it sought to contest Hobby Lobby’s claim of complicity on moral 
 
 61 Ginsburg articulated a distinction between “‘factual allegations that [the  
plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’ which a court must accept as 
true, and the ‘legal conclusion . . . that [the plaintiffs’] religious exercise is substantially 
burdened,’ an inquiry the court must undertake.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798  
(Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 679 (DC Cir 2008). 
But the two cases she cited do not support her assertion that courts may judge whether 
the religious adherent is right to believe himself complicit in the conduct contravening 
his religious convictions. Instead, in both cases, the Court punted on the question wheth-
er the adherent’s burden was substantial because, in both, the Court concluded that the 
asserted burden was not of the kind that courts need to recognize in the first place. Thus, 
in the first case Ginsburg cited, Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693 (1986), the Court asserted that 
the Free Exercise Clause did not include a right of the religious believer to mandate that 
the government conduct its affairs in a manner consistent with the believer’s faith. Id at 
699–700. The issue there, then, was not so much whether the believer would be complicit 
in the government’s conduct of its own affairs as it was whether his concerns about his 
(supposed) complicity warranted accommodation. The second case, Hernandez v  
Commission of Internal Revenue, 490 US 680 (1989), did speculate about whether the 
alleged burden was substantial, but it did not conclusively decide the issue, arguing that 
even if the burden were substantial, the government’s compelling interest would justify 
the burden’s imposition. Id at 699. Put differently, we might see the issue here in terms 
similar to those in Roy: the question might be not “Does the regulation impose a substan-
tial burden on the religious adherents?” so much as it is (and as it was in Roy) “Is this 
the kind of burden we have reason to accommodate?” Neither Roy nor Hernandez, then, 
stands for the proposition that the substantial-burden inquiry invites the Court to chal-
lenge a believer’s assertion that he is complicit (although, again, it does permit the Court 
to determine whether to exempt him at the end of the day). 
 62 Compare University of Notre Dame v Sebelius, 743 F3d 547, 558 (7th Cir 2014) 
(“Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial burden, but substantiality—like 
compelling governmental interest—is for the court to decide.”), and Kaemmerling, 553 
F3d at 678 (“An inconsequential or de minimis burden on religious practice does not rise 
to [the level of a substantial burden under RFRA], nor does a burden on activity unim-
portant to the adherent’s religious scheme.”), with Korte, 735 F3d at 683, quoting Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc v Sebelius, 723 F3d 1114, 1137 (10th Cir 2013):  
[W]e agree with our colleagues in the Tenth Circuit that the substantial-
burden test under RFRA focuses primarily on the “intensity of the coercion ap-
plied by the government to act contrary to [religious] beliefs.” . . . Put another 
way, the substantial-burden inquiry evaluates the coercive effect of the gov-
ernmental pressure on the adherent’s religious practice and steers well clear of 
deciding religious questions. 
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and relational grounds.63 More specifically, the dissent judged 
the owners’ claims of complicity against its own understanding, 
which can be summarized by this proposition: unless an actor 
has (1) taken part in the decision to pursue some act and 
(2) participated directly in that act, he should not be taken to be 
responsible for that act. I take up each of these supposed re-
quirements in turn. 
1. Decisionmaking and complicity. 
The dissent, along with some commentators and some of the 
lower court opinions in the contraceptive-mandate challenges, 
maintained that the mandate does not make the employer com-
plicit in its employees’ uses of contraception because the em-
ployer does not participate in the decision about whether to use 
contraception.64 As Ginsburg stated, “the decisions whether to 
claim benefits under the plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or 
Conestoga, but by the covered employees and dependents, in 
consultation with their health care providers.”65 As such, “[n]o 
individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to 
use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is 
in any meaningful sense [her employer’s] decision or action.”66 
Judge Ilana Rovner, dissenting in a Seventh Circuit mandate 
challenge, made a similar argument, contending that 
“[a]lthough funds from the company health plan are being used 
to facilitate [the employee’s contraceptive] choice, no objective 
observer would attribute that choice to the company, let alone 
its owner.”67 And so, Ginsburg and Rovner each concluded, the 
 
 63 By contrast, the dissent agreed with the majority that courts “must accept as 
true” the religious objectors’ factual allegations. Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798  
(Ginsburg dissenting). I argue that deference to the objectors’ understanding of the facts 
is unwarranted. See Part I.D.2. 
 64 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting); Grote v Sebelius, 708 F3d 
850, 865 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting). See also Autocam Corp v Sebelius, 2012 WL 
6845677, *7 (WD Mich):  
The mandate does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do anything. They 
do not have to use or buy contraceptives for themselves or anyone else. It is on-
ly the legally separate entities they currently own that have any obligation un-
der the mandate. The law protects that separation between the corporation 
and its owners. 
 65 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 66 Id (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Grote, 708 F3d at 865 (Rovner dissenting). 
 67 Korte, 735 F3d at 718 (Rovner dissenting). 
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employee’s decision cannot impose a substantial burden on the 
employer’s exercise of religion.68 
The argument here is familiar from cases in which taxpay-
ers have raised Establishment Clause objections to public fund-
ing for programs when the funding recipient elects to use the 
funds at a religious institution. Thus, for example, in Zelman v 
Simmons-Harris,69 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a 
school voucher program compelled taxpayers to subsidize reli-
gion.70 The Court reasoned that because the program did not 
privilege or otherwise single out religious institutions, and be-
cause public money reached religious schools solely by way of 
“genuine and independent private choice,” taxpayers had no rea-
son to think that they or the government was funding religion.71 
The general form of these arguments is as follows: the objec-
tor does not choose the conduct he deems objectionable, so he is 
not responsible for that conduct. Yet this is a very cramped view 
of complicity, for it presumes that one can be complicit only in 
conduct that one chooses.72 The real question here is not wheth-
er an employee’s decision belongs to, or is attributable to, her 
employer, but instead whether the employer bears some respon-
sibility for the employee’s act even if the employer did not partici-
pate in the decision to pursue that act. 
To see that one can bear responsibility for another’s act in-
dependent of whether one took part in the decision to pursue 
that act, consider a gun merchant who sells a weapon that she 
knows the buyer will use to kill someone else. There is no sense 
in which the decision to kill this other person is the merchant’s. 
Here, as in the contraceptive-mandate case, there is an “inter-
ruption” in the causal “linkage” between the merchant’s act and 
 
 68 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting); Korte, 735 F3d at 718 
(Rovner dissenting). 
 69 536 US 639 (2002). 
 70 Id at 662–63. See also Witters v Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 
474 US 481, 489 (1986) (upholding, against an Establishment Clause challenge, the use 
of state financial aid for tuition at a Christian college at which the recipient was to pur-
sue bible studies); Zobrest v Catalina Foothills School District, 509 US 1, 13–14 (1993) 
(rejecting an Establishment Clause claim objecting to the use of public funding for a sign 
language interpreter for a student attending a Catholic high school). 
 71 Simmons-Harris, 536 US at 652. 
 72 Compare H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 129 (Oxford 2d ed 
1985) (articulating an interventionist position supporting Ginsburg’s dissent), with 
Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Meta-
physics 233–53 (Oxford 2009) (arguing that an accomplice’s responsibility does not evap-
orate simply because the perpetrator’s intention “intervenes” in the causal chain). 
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the killing—namely, the decision on the part of the buyer to 
commit the killing.73 But the mere fact that the decision is not 
the merchant’s does not absolve her of moral responsibility for 
the resulting death. (Nor would she necessarily escape criminal 
liability under the law.)74 And indeed, many of us would hold 
that she is complicit in the killing, because she provided the gun 
to the killer knowing that he would use it as a murder weapon, 
and without seeking to prevent the killing, warn the victim or 
police, and so on. 
Moreover, on other accounts of shared responsibility, some-
thing even less than knowledge can be enough to sustain a 
judgment of complicity.75 Thus, on these accounts, a person can 
be complicit in another’s wrong if he merely shares the wrongful 
attitudes that motivated the wrong (for example, all racist indi-
viduals share responsibility for a racially motivated crime),76 or 
if he and the perpetrator are participating in a joint project that 
the wrong furthers, even if he did not know and had no reason to 
know that the perpetrator would choose wrongful means to ad-
vance their shared end.77 In short, conceptions of complicity may 
be far more expansive than the dissent recognizes. 
 
 73 The quoted language here borrows from the terminology Ginsburg used in her 
dissenting opinion: “It is doubtful that Congress, when it specified that burdens must be 
‘substantia[l],’ had in mind a linkage thus interrupted by independent decisionmakers 
(the woman and her health counselor) standing between the challenged government ac-
tion and the religious exercise claimed to be infringed.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 
(Ginsburg dissenting). 
 74 Backun v United States, 112 F2d 635, 637 (4th Cir 1940) (“One who sells a gun to 
another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder, would hardly escape convic-
tion as an accessory to the murder by showing that he received full price for the gun.”). 
For an excellent and probing overview of accomplice liability under domestic and crimi-
nal law in the context of weapons provision, see generally James G. Stewart, The Accom-
plice Liability of Arms Vendors: A Conceptual Defense (unpublished manuscript, July 11, 
2014) (on file with author). 
 75 See, for example, Larry May, Sharing Responsibility 50 (Chicago 1992) (noting 
that one can bear responsibility for a hate crime, for example, simply because one public-
ly endorsed the attitudes that the crime expresses); Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics 
and Law for a Collective Age 107–12, 147–61 (Cambridge 2000) (grounding shared re-
sponsibility in shared ends, even when one party undertakes measures to achieve those 
ends that another party opposes); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New 
Essays in Plural Subject Theory 14–16 (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) (grounding shared 
responsibility for a group act in the obligations that members owe one another to form 
and sustain a “plural subject” of their joint activity).  
 76 See May, Sharing Responsibility at 50 (cited in note 75).  
 77 See Kutz, Complicity at 156–61 (cited in note 75). The understanding of complici-
ty here is embodied in the kind of conspiracy liability captured in the Pinkerton doctrine. 
See Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640, 647–48 (1946) (establishing a rule of conspir-
acy liability in which a conspirator may be liable for criminal offenses committed by a 
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With that said, it is certainly not the case that facilitation 
always makes the facilitator responsible for the act or choice 
that he facilitates.78 The point is instead that an account deny-
ing that one can be complicit in an act unless one chooses that 
act overlooks a great many ways in which one can be responsi-
ble. 
2. Complicity as direct participation. 
Ginsburg’s overly narrow view of complicity finds an echo in 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Wheaton College v Burwell,79 
which the two other female justices joined. In that case, Wheaton 
College, “an explicitly Christian” institution,80 contended that it 
would be complicit in contraceptive use as a result of its filling 
out a form registering its objection to the contraceptive man-
date, because filling out the form would “trigger[ ] the obligation 
for someone else to provide the services to which it objects.”81 In 
response, the dissent argued that Wheaton’s “claim ignores that 
the provision of contraceptive coverage is triggered not by its 
completion of the self-certification form, but by federal law.”82 To 
buttress its argument, the dissent borrowed an analogy that Judge 
Posner invoked in another contraceptive-mandate challenge. 
In University of Notre Dame v Sebelius,83 Posner described a 
scenario involving a Quaker who seeks an exemption from a 
wartime draft because he subscribes to his religion’s pacifism.84 
 
coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, in furtherance of the conspira-
cy, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy). 
 78 For example, if one is innocently ignorant of the fact that one acts in facilitation 
of a crime, one will not bear responsibility for that crime. Further, the same result ob-
tains if one knows that one facilitates a crime but one does not do anything additional to 
what one was on track to do anyway. See Benton Martin and Jeremiah Newhall, Tech-
nology and the Guilty Mind: When Do Technology Providers Become Criminal Accomplic-
es? J Crim L & Crimin *41–42 (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/JUQ9-9T85 
(arguing that the bus driver who knowingly drives a passenger to the passenger’s in-
tended crime scene is not culpable, but the taxi driver who does so is, since the bus driv-
er does not deviate from his scheduled route—he literally does not go out of his way to 
provide the assistance—whereas the taxi driver’s act is directly responsive to the  
criminal’s plan). 
 79 134 S Ct 2806 (2014). 
 80 About Wheaton (Wheaton College), archived at http://perma.cc/43JN-KYJH. 
 81 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2808 (Sotomayor dissenting). See also Notre Dame, 
743 F3d at 554. 
 82 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2808 (Sotomayor dissenting). Seven of the eight 
federal appellate courts to hear challenges to the proposed accommodation have adopted 
similar reasoning and have thus ruled against the challengers. See note 12.  
 83 743 F3d 547 (7th Cir 2014).  
 84 Id at 556.  
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The selective service officer grants the Quaker the exemption 
but then notes that someone else will be drafted in his place.85 
The Quaker is indignant, insisting that recruiting someone else 
will violate the very religious belief that prompted him to seek 
the exemption in the first instance: “Because [the Quaker’s] reli-
gion teaches that no one should bear arms, drafting another per-
son in his place would make him responsible for the military ac-
tivities of his replacement.”86 But, Posner continued, the Quaker 
is in fact responsible neither for the drafting of a replacement 
nor for any fighting in which the replacement participates.87 By 
“exempting him[,] the government [has not] forced him to ‘trig-
ger’ the drafting of a replacement who was not a conscientious 
objector.”88 As such, Posner concluded that RFRA does not “re-
quire a draft exemption for both the Quaker and his non-Quaker 
replacement.”89 
The conclusion here is right: RFRA does not require the mil-
itary to forsake finding a replacement for the pacifist to whom it 
grants an exemption. But the conclusion does not follow from 
the argument preceding it. The Quaker does in fact cause mili-
tary participation that would not have occurred otherwise: 
someone will end up serving who would not have served but for 
the Quaker’s exemption. The situation would be different if the 
military called someone up—call him Smith—but then turned 
Smith away, deciding that he was unfit for service. The selective 
service officer would then go to the next name on the list and 
someone—say, Jones—would end up serving who would not 
have been recruited but for the unfitness of Smith. Smith would 
not have “triggered” Jones’s recruitment. What distinguishes 
Smith from the Quaker, then? It is the very choice that the ex-
emption opponents invoke as the consideration that makes the 
moral difference: The Quaker chooses not to serve, thereby alter-
ing the set of individuals who do serve by virtue of his intention-
al act. But Smith is turned away; the fact that someone else will 
serve in his place is not attributable to him. 
Moreover, suppose that Posner and Sotomayor were right 
that it is the draft itself that does the triggering, not the  
 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 556.  
 88 Id. This quotation, as well as the one in the text accompanying the following 
note, has been altered such that the rhetorical questions in the original are recast here 
as the assertions that the rhetorical questions are meant to imply. 
 89 Id. 
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Quaker’s successful bid for an exemption. The Quaker and 
Smith are still distinguishable on moral grounds because the 
Quaker would have an independent reason for caring about the 
fact that someone will be replacing him that Smith (who pre-
sumably is not a pacifist) does not have. What matters for the 
Quaker is not (or not only) that his choice places someone in bat-
tle who would have escaped the draft were it not for the  
Quaker’s exemption; it is that the Quaker’s exemption is un-
dermined if the result for the world—one more soldier fighting—
is the same whether or not the Quaker is granted the exemption. 
One does no more than an end run around the moral prohibi-
tions that should constrain one’s conduct—in the Quaker’s case, 
the prohibition against participating in warfare—if one merely 
outsources the prohibited conduct.90 This is not to say that the 
military must, as a matter of respecting the Quaker’s objection, 
desist from finding someone to take his place; the cost to the war 
effort of reducing the number of available soldiers so that no 
conscientious objector is replaced might well be too great. But it 
is to point out that the Quaker’s objection to the military’s re-
placing him has some merit, Posner’s (or Sotomayor’s) rejection 
of it notwithstanding. If there is a reason to deny the Quaker’s 
request that no one replace him, then, it is not because he has 
no legitimate reason to think himself complicit in the fighting in 
which his replacement will engage but because the burden on 
others of acceding to the request is more than he has a right to 
impose. A similar line of argument can be used to demonstrate 
that the religious nonprofits’ objections to HHS’s accommodation 
procedure are also on firmer footing than most rulings on their 
challenges have recognized.91 
 
 90 See, for example, Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 
Const Commen 365, 375 (2006) (“If it would be a violation of your conscience to do X, it 
should similarly be a violation of conscience if you pay other people to do X.”); Ed 
Hedemann, ed, Guide to War Tax Resistance 94 (War Resisters League 3d ed 1986) 
(“[I]t’s immoral to pay someone to do what it would be immoral to do yourself . . . War is 
immoral, and I can’t pay taxes that will buy war.”). The idea that one cannot escape 
complicity by having someone else do the thing that one’s religion prohibits is common in 
religious doctrine and practice. In Jewish law, for example, it is impermissible to employ 
a “Shabbos goy”—that is, a non-Jew whom one asks to carry out on one’s behalf some of 
the tasks prohibited on Shabbat. See Aryeh Citron, The Myth of the “Shabbos Goy” 
(Chabad-Lubavitch Media Center), archived at http://perma.cc/SLV9-VN8Z; Joseph Ja-
cobs and Judah David Eisenstein, Shabbat Goy (Jewish Encyclopedia), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X6X8-2FU5. 
 91 Most of the courts considering these challenges have contended that nonprofits 
do not trigger contraceptive coverage by filling out a form registering their objections to 
the contraceptive mandate and so they are not complicit in that contraceptive coverage; 
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as such, the accommodation procedure does not substantially burden their religious  
exercise. See note 12. For a succinct statement of the argument against the objectors, see 
University of Notre Dame v Burwell, 786 F3d 606, 614 (7th Cir 2015).  
 These cases address the revised accommodation procedure. The original procedure, 
challenged in Wheaton College, required the religious nonprofit to notify its TPA of its 
objection. See note 10. The new procedure requires no more of the religious objector than 
that it notify HHS of its objection; it is then HHS’s responsibility to notify the TPA. 79 
Fed Reg at 51094–95 (cited in note 10). So, relative to the policy contemplated by the Su-
preme Court in Wheaton College, the new procedure contains one more layer of bureau-
cracy, and so one more layer of insulation, between the nonprofit and the party subsidiz-
ing contraception.  
 With that said, there are at least two reasons to have sympathy for the nonprofits’ 
contention that the new procedure does not alleviate their complicity concerns. First, the 
premise underlying the new procedure is itself suspect: The thought seems to be that by 
having HHS serve as an intermediary between the nonprofit and the TPA, the connec-
tion between the nonprofit and contraceptive coverage is made more tenuous and so the 
magnitude of culpability that the nonprofit bears should be diminished. But the pre-
sumed connection between proximity and culpability is wrongheaded, for reasons I artic-
ulate in Part III.B–C. 
 Second, the argument about triggering fails to take seriously the felt experience of 
contributing to conduct that one deems gravely wrong. Imagine the following hypothet-
ical: Suppose that the government has decided that it is permissible to kill young babies 
for sport so long as one has a license to do so. Suppose further that the government has 
determined that a key way for individuals to obtain such licenses is through their em-
ployers. The government recognizes that some employers object to infanticide, so it de-
velops a policy whereby objecting employers can register their objections with the gov-
ernment, which will then let a third-party provider know that it should issue the licenses 
to the employees of the objecting organization in the organization’s stead. If the objecting 
organization does not register its objection, the government will find a way of letting the 
third-party provider know of its obligations. Specifically, the government will have to do 
more work to determine the identity of the provider and the names of the eligible em-
ployees. But at the end of the day, the outcome will be the same. That is, the same num-
ber of licenses will be issued whether or not the employer issues them, whether or not 
the employer formally registers its objection with the government, or whether the em-
ployer refuses to participate and the government has to gather the relevant information 
on its own. Suppose, finally, that the objecting employer knows all of this: it knows that, 
no matter what it does, the same number of babies will be killed. Would it then be un-
reasonable for the employer to refuse to register its objection? 
 I think not. For someone with objections to infanticide, issuing the killing licenses 
should of course be out of the question. But seeking an accommodation is not without its 
moral costs, too. Filing an objection would signal that one’s worry lies with one’s own 
participation, rather than with the practice itself; it would ratify the accommodation 
scheme and so imply that one saw infanticide as a practice about which reasonable 
minds could differ. But one who genuinely thought that infanticide was wrong would not 
want to have anything to do with it at all. He should refuse to take part in any aspect of 
the practice that would normalize it. This includes acceding to the government’s accom-
modation procedure. So the objector need not think that registering his objection “trig-
gers” the issuance of licenses for him to think that he has a valid reason to object; he can 
instead see his refusal to register as a meaningful way for him to protest a scheme that 
allows anyone to do something that he deems deplorable. 
 To be clear, this hypothetical is not intended to suggest that killing babies is the 
moral equivalent of using contraception. The point is instead that, for someone who sees 
some act as a grave moral wrong, doing anything other than refusing to have any part in 
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More generally, the flaw in the Quaker analogy and the de-
cisions denying that the accommodation procedure imposes a 
substantial burden is that they acknowledge complicity only for 
those acts in which one participates directly, ignoring the possi-
ble responsibility one comes to bear through a surrogate, or by 
facilitating someone else’s commission of a wrong, or perhaps 
even just by legitimating the overarching scheme through which 
others are permitted to commit wrongs.92 We shall see that this 
narrow understanding of complicity permeates much of the legal 
and moral treatment of conscientious objection, and that much 
of this understanding is problematically chary.93 Before turning 
to a more general survey and critique of the conceptions of com-
plicity in the law and their moral underpinnings, however, we 
should assess the understanding of complicity in the majority 
opinion, for it is as troublingly broad as the dissent’s is narrow. 
C. Complicity as Subjective Implication 
The majority described what was at stake for the religious 
owners in Hobby Lobby in this way: “[The owners] believe that 
providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is 
connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is suffi-
cient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage.”94 The 
majority insisted that “it [was] not for [the Court] to say that 
[the owners’] religious beliefs [were] mistaken or insubstan-
tial.”95 The owners believed that the mandate imposed a “sub-
stantial burden” on their religious exercise, and the Court took 
them at their word.96 
In so doing, the majority accepted at face value the owners’ 
factual assertion that the four contraceptive measures to which 
 
the act will evoke reasonable concerns about complicity. Courts and commentators  
addressing challenges to the accommodation procedure fail to appreciate this fact, I be-
lieve, only because they illicitly allow their sense that contraceptive use is permissible to 
inform their judgments about whether objectors have reason to feel like the accommoda-
tion procedures are morally inculpating. After all, there can be no complicity if there is 
no wrong to start with. I have no objection to contraceptive use, but I do think that we 
need to take more seriously the perspective of those who do. The concededly dramatic 
reference to infanticide is meant to illustrate what taking the objectors’ perspective seri-
ously might entail. 
 92 For a hypothetical example of this last source of complicity, see note 91. 
 93 See Parts II, III. 
 94 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778.  
 95 Id at 2779.  
 96 Id. 
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they objected result in the “destruction of an embryo,”97 even 
though the medical community does not believe that this is how 
these measures in fact work.98 The majority deferred to the own-
ers’ moral claim that it is wrong to destroy embryos. And the 
majority further accepted the owners’ relational claim that the 
contraceptive mandate would connect the owners to this (sup-
posed) destruction in a way that would render them complicit in 
it. In short, the majority deferred completely to the owners’ fac-
tual, moral, and relational claims. The Court’s unhesitating def-
erence stands in stark contrast to the dissent’s approach, which 
evidenced an equally unhesitating effort to review, and then re-
ject, the owners’ belief that they would be complicit in embryo 
destruction were they to subsidize coverage of (alleged) abortifa-
cients. Which approach should we prefer: one that does or does 
not seek to judge the factual, moral, and relational underpin-
nings of a complicity claim? It is now time to assess just which of 
these elements, if any, warrants deference. 
D. Deference to Nonstandard Beliefs 
In this Section, I treat each of the dimensions of the owners’ 
complicity claim—its moral, empirical, and relational ele-
ments—in turn. In so doing, I assume that the owners’ beliefs 
are sincerely held. Sincerity is an independent basis on which a 
court may inquire into the cogency of a bid for religious accom-
modation.99 Some commentators have suggested that some of 
those who seek an exemption from the contraceptive mandate 
might be feigning objections to contraception on opportunistic 
grounds in order to lower their insurance costs or curry favor 
with their religious customer base.100 These objectors are not the 
protagonists of my inquiry, however. I mean to focus only on the 
employers who genuinely believe that some or all contraceptive 
use (or blood transfusions or the like) are wrong, and that subsi-
 
 97 Id at 2775. 
 98 See notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Ben Adams and Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the 
Courts after Hobby Lobby, 67 Stan L Rev Online 59, 59–60 (2014) (“[C]ourts historically 
have demonstrated that they are able to ferret out insincere religious claims. There is a 
long tradition of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for sincerity 
without delving into their validity or verity.”). 
 100 See, for example, Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate 
Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 
Harv L Rev F 273, 293 (2014) (noting the risk of opportunism in both corporate and indi-
vidual claims for accommodations under RFRA). 
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dizing a wrong renders them morally responsible for it. The doc-
trine already permits courts to inquire into the sincerity of the 
objector’s professed religious beliefs, and I leave it to courts to 
ferret out the opportunists from the true believers. 
Further, the objectors that I consider must operate with 
strong opposition to contributing to the conduct that they deem 
wrong. A mild preference to abstain will not do; instead, it must 
be the case that contributing would cause the objector to experi-
ence a deep rift in his self, so much so that he would be willing 
to incur some penalty to avoid betraying his convictions.101 We 
should require this strength of conviction because the objector, 
like other citizens, bears a duty of political obedience,102 and 
mere distaste for a legal requirement is not sufficient to over-
come this duty. Instead, if he is to prevail in his bid for an ex-
emption from a law that binds his compatriots, the objector 
must have reasons strong enough for his compatriots to think 
him justified—not on the merits necessarily but simply by virtue 
of the inner turmoil that obedience would cause. I will not try to 
identify precisely how strong these reasons should be or how we 
should determine their strength, but I assume that the typical 
sentiments voiced around claims of conscience—for example, “I 
couldn’t live with myself if I were to . . .”103 or “I would rather suf-
fer punishment than obey . . .”104—would, if sincere, be sufficiently 
 
 101 See Plato, Gorgias 38 (Liberal Arts 1952) (W.C. Helmbold, trans) (“[Socrates:] 
And I, for my part, imagine that you and I and everyone else believe that to do wrong is 
worse than to be wronged and that not to be punished for wrongdoing is worse than to 
suffer punishment.”). See also Martin Luther King Jr, Letter from a Birmingham Jail 
[King, Jr.] (University of Pennsylvania), archived at http://perma.cc/S3CT-HV98 (“I 
submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who 
willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.”); 
Girouard v United States, 328 US 61, 68 (1946) (“Throughout the ages, men have suf-
fered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State. 
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle.”).  
 102 See, for example, Margaret Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation: Member-
ship, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society 91 (Clarendon 2006); H.L.A. Hart, Are There 
Any Natural Rights?, 64 Philosophical Rev 175, 185 (1955). See also generally Michael O. 
Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J Phil 333 (1994); John Horton, Political Obligation 
(Humanities 1992). 
 103 See Paul Formosa, Thinking, Conscience and Acting in Times of Crises, in  
Andrew Schaap, Danielle Celermajer, and Vrasidas Karalis, eds, Power, Judgment and 
Political Evil: In Conversation with Hannah Arendt 89, 94 (Ashgate 2010) (describing  
Hannah Arendt’s view of conscience as “advising on the pain of being unable to live with 
oneself that one ought not to perform certain actions”). 
 104 See note 101. But see Jonathan Bennett, The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn, 49 
Phil 123, 133 (1974) (arguing that conscience will typically track received moral or legal 
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strong. The idea might be cashed out in a norm of reciprocity: 
were others to feel as tormented as the objector does, they too 
would expect an exemption from the legal requirement (assum-
ing that their exemption imposed no more costs on third parties 
or the legal regime, at any rate). So they should recognize the 
objector’s desire to avoid this torment as a legitimate ground for 
an exemption. With that said, worries about sincerity might 
arise anew—here, with respect not to whether the objector holds 
the asserted conviction but instead to whether violating it will 
cause him as much pain as he claims. Again, though, courts are 
empowered to evaluate whether the objector really is as beset by 
inner turmoil as he contends. So much, then, for concerns about 
insincere or casual objectors. 
But there is another set of mandate opponents whom I do 
not consider here. As some commentators have compellingly ar-
gued, some of the opposition to the mandate is intended not (or 
not merely) to avoid complicity in contraceptive use but instead 
(or in addition) to prevent that use altogether.105 If these com-
mentators are right, then what is at stake in some of the man-
date cases is not an interest in being left alone, as it was in the 
traditional religious freedom cases.106 Instead, we should see 
that some of the opponents of the mandate mean to undermine 
women’s access to contraception—with potentially devastating 
effects for women’s equality.107 For example, Professors Douglas 
NeJaime and Reva Siegel detail the ways in which some bids for 
a conscientious exemption from the contraceptive mandate, or 
from antidiscrimination laws that would protect gays and lesbi-
ans, function as the next frontier in the culture wars. They mar-
shal statements from advocates at the front lines who articulate 
an evangelical mission: the goal for these advocates is to urge 
and impose on others a “traditional morality” in which contra-
 
precepts that guide conduct through reasoned argument, while sympathy or compassion, 
typically viscerally felt, can be a truer guide to morally right action).  
 105 See, for example, NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2520 (cited in note 28). 
 106 See id at 2524–56. 
 107 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Republican War against Women (Justia, Oct 3, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6LZC-F9HH (“This is not simply a move to ensure that 
contraception isn’t paid for; it is an all-out war on women. This is the pushback to the 
feminist revolution, and it is being fostered by the religious organizations that believe 
that women should be subservient to men.”); Ruth Rosen, The War against Contracep-
tion: “Women Must Be Liberated from Their Libidios” (Huffington Post, Apr 21, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/B88D-H7S5 (quoting Ilyse Hogue, president of the National 
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, who stated that “[t]he truth is that 
this is not about religious freedom, it’s about sexism, and a fear of women’s sexuality”).  
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ception (along with abortion and same-sex marriage) is verbo-
ten.108 NeJaime and Siegel convincingly argue that the strategy 
of these religious advocates is an example of “preservation 
through transformation”:109 “[W]hen an existing legal regime is 
successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer 
seem persuasive or legitimate, defenders may adopt new rules 
and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged regime.”110 
Put differently, religious opponents of women’s reproductive 
rights or same-sex marriage wield the banner of religious liberty 
in an effort to secure through courts the outcome denied to them 
in Congress (or state legislatures)—to wit, a culture that is in-
hospitable to the practices and lifestyles that they deplore on re-
ligious or ideological grounds. 
The strategies and motives that NeJaime and Siegel de-
scribe should leave those of us committed to both equality and 
toleration deeply dismayed. Nonetheless, I do not consider the 
political and ideological use of complicity claims further. The in-
quiry here is intended to reach beyond the contraceptive man-
date to cases in which there is a genuine conflict between a reli-
gious adherent who, with entirely benign motives, objects to 
some legal requirement and accommodating his objection impos-
es costs on others. I assume that at least some of those objecting 
to the employer mandate really do care only for the state of their 
own souls, and I mean to examine how the law should respond 
to them. This is already a vexing problem, and, as it arises in 
the contraceptive-mandate context (as well as in contexts involv-
ing refusals to cover the health-care costs of homosexual em-
ployees’ spouses, or to serve gay or lesbian customers), it already 
implicates concerns about equality. It will be worth clarifying 
the proper response to a straightforward, genuine conflict be-
tween conscience and third-party interests, including the inter-
ests of discrete, historically oppressed groups. I leave questions 
about bids for religious accommodations aimed at sabotaging a 
 
 108 NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2542–54 (cited in note 28). 
 109 Id at 2552–53 & n 151. For Siegel’s seminal articulations of her “preservation 
through transformation” paradigm, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating 
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L J 2117, 2119 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Pro-
tection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan 
L Rev 1111, 1113 (1997). For NeJaime’s extension of that work to the context of sexual 
orientation, see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Reli-
gious Exemptions, and the Perpetuation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 Cal L 
Rev 1169, 1212–13 (2012).  
 110 NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2553 (cited in note 28). 
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legislative regime or expressing animus toward women or homo-
sexuals for another day.111 
1. Moral deference. 
Deference to the moral claim at issue in a conscientious ob-
jection requires a court to take at face value the objector’s claim 
that his religion finds some act or practice morally impermissi-
ble. This form of deference is not difficult to defend. 
In moral and religious matters, we are often without a ca-
pacity for certitude that would allow us to discern truth and fal-
sity.112 Thus, some theorists defend moral deference on the part 
of the state on the basis of the skepticism and humility that we 
owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic society.113 Moral 
deference also protects against “the totalization of morality” on 
the part of the government.114 And moral convictions can be 
deeply entwined with a person’s sense of self and purpose. Given 
that we lack agreed-upon ways to adjudicate among moral con-
victions, and given the importance that these convictions can 
play in a person’s life, the state should generally refrain from 
declaring these convictions true or false. In other words, moral 
deference is the appropriate stance for a polity rife with multiple 
and competing conceptions of the good.115 Thus, the doctrine here 
is generally correct in finding that it is not for courts “to say that 
the line [of permissibility drawn by the religious adherent is] an 
unreasonable one.”116 
 
 111 I aim to address some of these issues in Amy J. Sepinwall, The Challenges of 
Conscience in a World of Compromise, in Jack Knight, ed, Nomos: Compromise (forth-
coming 2015) (on file with author). 
 112 Professor Simon Căbulea May has implicitly embraced the view that we can and 
should adjudicate moral claims on the basis of their truth or falsity. See Simon Căbulea 
May, Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy, 33 Phil & Pub Aff 317, 336 
(2005) (“Complicity in an activity is only really a moral problem if that activity really is 
unethical. Merely believing it to be immoral does not in itself ground a claim to special 
treatment.”). 
 113 See, for example, M.M. Moody-Adams, Democratic Conflict and the Political Mo-
rality of Compromise *17 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2014) (on file with author); Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 85 (Belknap 1996). 
 114 Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U Ill L Rev 
1457, 1494. 
 115 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 133–34 (Columbia 1993) (noting the diffi-
culties of maintaining stability and unity in a democratic society, given a citizenry deep-
ly divided on religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines). 
 116 Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707, 
715 (1981). 
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With that said, one might think that there are some moral 
beliefs so objectionable that they deserve no deference at all. 
Consider, for example, the belief that “homosexuality is wrong” 
(or, worse still, that “homosexuals are evil”). Shouldn’t there be 
limits on moral deference to ensure that courts—which are state 
actors par excellence117—are not compelled to treat animus on 
par with other moral beliefs? 
Two responses are in order. First, according deference to a 
claim that denigrates another group is not the same as endors-
ing that claim. A court faced with such a claim should treat it 
with deference but also clearly articulate that the claim flies in 
the face of our most fundamental constitutional values. Courts, 
that is, must not only serve religious freedom but also speak in 
favor of the notion of equal respect that underpins our constitu-
tional regime.118 Second, deferring to this religious claim does 
not commit a court to issuing an exemption as a result. The 
court must still weigh the objector’s assertion against the gov-
ernment’s interest.119 In some instances, the government will in-
voke its compelling interest in the eradication of, say, racism, 
and it will wield that interest to defeat the bid for an exemption. 
Thus, for example, in Bob Jones University v United States,120 
the Government withdrew the university’s tax-exempt status, on 
public policy grounds. Bob Jones had a policy of denying admis-
sion to students who had married outside their race and expel-
ling students who dated or married interracially while en-
rolled.121 The Government contended that nonprofit status 
should be held only by entities that advance a public purpose,122 
there is a public policy against racial discrimination, an entity 
that violates a public policy cannot be advancing a public  
 
 117 See, for example, Shelley v Kramer, 334 US 1, 15 (1948) (“[J]udicial action is to 
be regarded as action of the State.”); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US (10 Otto) 339, 347 (1879) 
(“A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no 
other way.”). 
 118 See Corey Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith-
Based Groups That Advocate Discrimination? State Funding and Nonprofit Status, in 
Austin Sarat, ed, Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States: Accommo-
dation and Its Limits 72, 74–75 (Cambridge 2012) (describing “democratic persua-
sion,” or the state’s responsibility to counter freedom of expression, with efforts to 
explain why discriminatory viewpoints “are inconsistent with a respect for free and 
equal citizenship”). 
 119 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 120 461 US 574 (1983).  
 121 Id at 580–81. 
 122 Id at 588. 
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purpose, and so Bob Jones did not qualify for nonprofit status.123 
As I suggest below, this argument does not target racism as 
squarely as we might like.124 But it does nonetheless stand as an 
instance in which the government recognizes the religious enti-
ty’s genuine conviction but then defeats that conviction on the 
basis of its own compelling interests. 
Moreover, as I argue below, courts must weigh the objec-
tionable moral conviction against not only the government’s in-
terests but also the interests of third parties.125 Third parties 
will presumably be able to marshal arguments that acceding to 
the believer’s hateful claim inflicts a grave injury on them—one 
so grave that the court should find it dispositive. But even if 
third parties choose not to become too vexed about the believer’s 
claim,126 the state must, again in its capacity as a defender of our 
constitutional regime, add to its arguments about the compelling 
interests underpinning the challenged legal requirement a 
statement decrying the challenge because it deviates from our 
most cherished constitutional values. 
In short, then, moral deference should be absolute, but it 
need not be enthusiastic, and it is but the first step in an inquiry 
anyway. We might expect that an interest against hate-based 
claims will be strong enough in most cases to defeat the request 
for an accommodation, even if courts must take the reasons for 
the request at face value.127 
 
 123 Id at 604. 
 124 See note 241. 
 125 See Part IV. 
 126 This is just what Professor Andrew Koppelman urges in the context of opposition 
to gay marriage, on the convincing thought that rights to same-sex marriage are now so 
widely accepted that those who support them can afford to be magnanimous, at least  
assuming that a policy allowing for discrimination against gays is accompanied by fea-
tures that would lessen the sting for individual gay couples. See generally Andrew  
Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 88 S Cal L Rev 619 (2015). 
 127 One might worry that the role I assign to the state in defending our constitution-
al values contravenes the neutral stance that a liberal state should occupy. The position 
that I am advocating does indeed deviate from a commitment to neutrality, but the devi-
ation is in the service of other, even more foundational values, without which liberalism 
would collapse. For a stirring and persuasive defense of this “value democracy,” see gen-
erally Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith-Based Groups 
That Advocate Discrimination? (cited in note 118); Corey Brettschneider, When the State 
Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote 
Equality (Princeton 2012). 
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2. Empirical deference. 
In contrast to moral claims, when it comes to factual asser-
tions, we freely adjudicate truth and falsity based on indicia that 
receive broad support and that we think the government may 
count as authoritative—typically, observation (mediated by 
technology, if necessary).128 It is thus surprising that both the 
majority and the dissent in Hobby Lobby announced that as-
sessing the factual—in particular, the scientific—merits of Hob-
by Lobby’s claim was verboten.129 
As we have seen, the owners refer to the four contested 
forms of contraception as “abortifacients”—that is, measures 
that have the effect of killing nascent human life. Yet medical 
authorities—such as the Institute of Medicine, which identified 
the forms of preventive care for women that the ACA should 
make available,130 along with the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists and other medical experts—believe that 
the drugs do not act directly on the embryo.131 According to the 
medical community, there is a very small possibility that the 
contested methods interfere with implantation and, without im-
plantation, the embryo cannot develop.132 But the general mech-
anism through which these methods work is by preventing 
sperm from fertilizing the egg in the first place,133 in which case 
there is no embryo at all. In short, then, the owners’ objection re-
lies on an understanding of facts with which the medical estab-
lishment disagrees.134 
 
 128 See Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? at 34 (cited in note 34) (“Religious beliefs . . . 
are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we 
employ in both common sense and in science.”). 
 129 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778; id at 2798 n 21 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 130 See generally Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Clinical Preven-
tive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps (National Academy of Sciences, July 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/34G7-NBKS. 
 131 Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access (cited in note 3) (“Research 
does not support the idea that [the covered forms of contraception] prevent fertilized 
eggs to implant.”); Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? (cited in note 50). 
 132 See Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access (cited in note 3) (“Be-
cause the doses of medication [in emergency contraception] are very short-term, they 
probably cannot affect the uterine lining in such a way as to affect implantation.”). 
 133 See Fill This Prescription (Scientific American, Sept 24, 2005), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AM4M-U2WN (“By medical definition, the pills block rather than termi-
nate pregnancy.”).  
 134 See, for example, Anna Glasier, Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 337 New 
Eng J Med 1058, 1063 (1997) (“It cannot be stressed too strongly that if hormonal emer-
gency contraception works largely by interfering with ovulation, then it cannot be re-
garded as an abortifacient.”). 
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No matter, the majority and dissent maintained, since 
courts are not permitted to gauge the “plausibility” of a religious 
claim.135 But surely this position overstates the bounds of defer-
ence that are and should be required. Thoroughgoing empirical 
deference would commit courts to taking at face value a religious 
adherent’s objection to subsidizing blood transfusions because, 
say, he believes the donated blood to have come from the devil.136 
More generally, so long as the religious adherent’s belief is sin-
cerely held and religiously based, it would establish a presump-
tion in favor of an exemption. The government could rebut that 
presumption only in the face of a compelling interest that the 
challenged law provides the least restrictive means of serving.137 
During oral argument in another contraceptive-mandate 
challenge, Judge Judith Rogers expressed incredulity in re-
sponse to the claim that courts are hamstrung when it comes to 
weighing in on the factual merits of a religious claim.138 And 
commentators contend not only that courts should be permitted 
 
 With that said, the factual beliefs propelling the owners are not without any support. 
The evidence showing that the four contested methods do not cause embryo destruction 
is “not-yet-conclusive.” Jonathan H. Adler, No, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Deci-
sion Is Not Based upon a Scientific Mistake (Wash Post, July 6, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MA48-HCDW. Professor Robin Wilson offers an extended discussion of 
the state of scientific knowledge around the mode of operation of these so-called abortifa-
cients. She concludes that the question whether these drugs can prevent implantation “is 
simply more complicated than [the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists’] blanket assertion suggests,” and she provides a wealth of citations to the writings 
of medical professionals to this effect. Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1455–59 & nn 140–57  
(cited in note 18). 
 135 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778; id at 2798 n 21 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 136 To be clear, this is not the ground on which Jehovah’s Witnesses rest their prohi-
bition against blood transfusions. Instead, they rely on a verse from the Old Testament 
prohibiting the ingestion of blood. Leviticus 17:10 (New International Version) (“I will 
set my face against any Israelite or any foreigner residing among them who eats blood, 
and I will cut them off from the people.”). 
 137 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 138 For an audio recording of the oral argument for this case, Priests for Life v Unit-
ed States Department of Health and Human Services, 772 F3d 229 (DC Cir 2014), see 
Oral Argument Recordings (May 8, 2014), online at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/record 
ings/recordings.nsf/DocsByRDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=201405 (visited Nov 7, 
2015) (Perma archive unavailable). See also Leslie C. Griffin, A Tractor Is Not a Gun, 
Even If You Sincerely Believe It Is (Hamilton and Griffin on Rights, May 18, 2014),  
archived at http://perma.cc/X4DS-W5Z8. Professor Leslie C. Griffin’s blog post reproduc-
es the colloquy between Rogers and the attorney representing Priests for Life, who main-
tained that the court would have to accept a religious objector’s claim that he was being 
asked to produce sheet metal for munitions even if he were mistaken and the sheet  
metal was to be used only for farm equipment. 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
1932  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1897 
   
to assess the factual bases of claims of complicity139 but also that 
they should not grant exemptions when these bases are false.140 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in 
particular, counsels against exemptions to providing emergency 
contraception when requests for exemptions are “based on un-
supported beliefs about [emergency contraception’s] primary 
mechanism of action.”141 
The willingness to weigh in on the empirical merits of a re-
ligious claim is not undue. Accepting all factual assertions as 
true no matter their plausibility would commit us to a life of ir-
rationality. Practical reasoning depends on a grasp not only of 
our convictions and aspirations but also of the truth about our 
factual circumstances, so that we may successfully apply the 
former to the latter. As such, we need a coherent epistemology 
from which we can gather certain empirical facts. With that 
said, one might contend that factual claims are not so different 
from moral claims in this regard. We would surely consign our-
selves to a life of irrationality or worse if we granted the truth of 
all moral claims—for example, claims like “it is permissible to 
kill humans for sport” or “one is morally required to oppress left-
handed individuals.” 
There is nonetheless a relevant ground of distinction be-
tween empirical and moral claims, which turns on the role of the 
state and state institutions in a liberal polity. The liberal state 
is committed to neutrality as among different “comprehensive 
doctrines.”142 As such, the state may not weigh in on the truth or 
merits of citizens’ moral, religious, or other evaluative beliefs. 
On the other hand, states, like individuals, must act, and they 
can do so rationally only if they have an accurate grasp of what 
the world is like. This is especially true of courts, which function 
as finders and triers of fact. There must be some agreed-upon 
 
 139 See Griffin, A Tractor Is Not a Gun (cited in note 138) (“The idea that all the fed-
eral laws can be challenged by any irrational belief is unprecedented. And that’s a fact.”). 
 140 See id.  
 141 Committee on Ethics, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medi-
cine *4 (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Nov 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DH8Z-323X. 
 142 Rawls, Political Liberalism at 192–94 (cited in note 115). See also Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 10–12 (Yale 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Why 
Liberals Should Care about Equality, in Ronald Dworkin, ed, A Matter of Principle 205, 
205–13 (Harvard 1985) (distinguishing between a liberalism of neutrality and a liberal-
ism of equality and arguing in favor of the latter); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Mo-
dernity 125 (Cambridge 1996) (describing neutrality as political liberals understand it 
but then cautioning against the use of the term). 
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set of standards and methods that allows courts to determine 
what facts are true. 
Our enlightenment ethos has anointed certain methodolo-
gies as truth conferring: observation, the scientific method, cer-
tain theoretical constructs, and so on have all been identified as 
reliable methods for capturing what the world is like. The state 
need not have a role in discovering and promoting moral truth, 
and by the lights of some versions of liberalism it should not 
have such a role. But it does need to have a role in policing em-
pirical truth, at least in the areas in which it is permitted to 
regulate. For example, HHS could not decide what basic health 
care should consist of if it did not have a way of apprehending 
the way that healthy bodies work and identifying the medical 
interventions that are effective in restoring a sick body to 
health. Similarly, the Department of Education could not arrive 
at a “common core” that is genuinely informative unless it fil-
tered truth from falsehood. In short, there is no state license for 
“epistemic abstinence” when it comes to taking cognizance of 
empirical facts about the world.143 
Indeed, it is not even clear that there could exist a state that 
would be neutral between the claims that empirical evidence 
supports and the claims that empirical evidence denies. How 
could we ever be in dialogue, let alone cooperate, with individu-
als who were completely unmoored from empirical reality?144 In 
this regard, it is notable that, even when some religious individ-
uals embrace empirical claims that the scientific establishment 
denies, the religious adherents do not outright reject the truth-
seeking methods of the scientific enterprise (which the liberal 
state adopts). Instead, claims contending that, for example, 
some methods of FDA-approved contraception function as abor-
tifacients,145 or claims denying global warming,146 invoke science 
 
 143 I borrow the term “epistemic abstinence” from Professor Joseph Raz, who uses it 
in reference to a position that he attributes to Professors John Rawls and Thomas Nagel, 
according to which the state may not seek to justify the theory of justice with which it 
operates. See generally Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 
19 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (1990). 
 144 See Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 5–6 (cited in note 142) (identi-
fying the capacity for dialogue as a necessary condition for equal rights). 
 145 See, for example, Richard M. Doerflinger, The HHS Mandate, Unborn Life, and 
the Professionals: A Cog in the Political Machine (The Witherspoon Institute, June 25, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S2RV-D63K. 
 146 See generally, for example, Roy W. Spencer, Climate Confusion: How Global 
Warming Hysteria Leads to Bad Science, Pandering Politicians, and Misguided Policies 
That Hurt the Poor (Encounter Books 2008). 
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for support. The person who would deny the legitimacy of empir-
ical evidence must either adduce empirical evidence in support 
of his position, in which case his efforts would be self-defeating, 
or abandon hope of convincing others that he is right. As such, it 
is exceedingly difficult to see how such a person could prevail 
upon the state to accede to his view.147 
For all these reasons, courts should accord no deference to 
empirical claims that are manifestly false. To do otherwise 
would be to consign to absurdity not just the parties before the 
court but also those whom deference affects. More generally, fac-
tual plausibility should indeed be a factor in determining how 
much deference a claim of complicity should enjoy. As such, if 
the scientific community were to have concluded that the four 
contested modes of contraception never interfered with implan-
tation and instead always acted prefertilization, then the Court 
would have been justified in rejecting Hobby Lobby’s claim of 
complicity, for the conduct to which Hobby Lobby objected ought 
not to have constituted a wrong even by the light of its own 
moral principle (that is, that destroying an embryo is wrong).148 
With that said, the questions of complicity that Hobby Lobby 
raised would not disappear if only we could conclusively estab-
lish that the Hobby Lobby owners got the facts wrong, because 
other employers challenging the contraceptive mandate object to 
all forms of contraception.149 As such, their claims require that 
we address the broader question of when and why we should de-
fer to the complicity claim of one of these employers. 
3. Relational deference. 
Hobby Lobby’s objection to the four contested contraception 
methods turns not only on its understanding of the medical 
facts, however far-fetched that understanding may be, but also 
 
 147 To put the point another way, the challenge of the radical skeptic would, if taken 
seriously, jeopardize far more than just the account advanced here. Indeed, the swath of 
propositions that rest at least in part on empirical evidence for their truth or persua-
siveness is immense. Most case law and legal scholarship would be debunked if we were 
to deem credible the radical skeptic’s view. Given the great weight of agreement on the 
other side, the burden of proof lies with him. For these reasons, I set aside concerns 
about radical skepticism. 
 148 I also note that, no matter the legitimacy of Hobby Lobby’s objection to the four 
so-called abortifacients, the larger issue—whether employers may exempt themselves 
from the contraceptive mandate—would remain for those employers who object on reli-
gious grounds to all forms of contraception. 
 149 See, for example, Gilardi v Sebelius, 926 F Supp 2d 273, 275 (DDC 2013); Newland 
v Sebelius, 542 Fed Appx 706, 707–08 (10th Cir 2013). 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
2015] Conscience and Complicity 1935 
 
on its understanding of when the company or its owners become 
complicit in the conduct to which they object. More specifically, 
Hobby Lobby contended that its moral and religious convictions 
entail that it may not subsidize coverage of the contested contra-
ceptive methods, because subsidization is a form of facilitation, 
and it may not facilitate or contribute to another’s wrong or 
probable wrong no matter how small the probability of wrongdo-
ing.150 Its concerns about its own complicity, then, turned not so 
much on its assessment of the facts as on a particularly demand-
ing conception of moral purity, as governed by a particularly ex-
pansive conception of responsibility. By Hobby Lobby’s lights, 
mere facilitation of an act that has even a small potential to in-
volve a wrong causes Hobby Lobby to be morally responsible for 
that wrong.151 Nor is Hobby Lobby alone in subscribing to this 
expansive conception of complicity: all employers who object to 
the ACA because it provides for health coverage to which the 
owners object (for example, the full panoply of contraceptive de-
vices, or vaccinations, blood transfusions, and so forth) worry 
that subsidization relates them to the medical treatment they 
deem wrong in a way that makes them morally responsible for 
that wrong. In general, then, those with conscientious objections 
to the contraceptive mandate believe that the threshold for com-
plicity is lower than what law and morality generally take it to 
be; for these objectors, a relatively weak connection might be 
sufficient to implicate them. 
What should we make of their unusually expansive sense of 
their own complicity? I have argued that courts should proceed 
with great deference when it comes to the moral elements of a 
conscientious objector’s complicity claim, but no deference when 
the claim’s empirical elements are manifestly false. Relational 
claims fall somewhere in between. In this regard, Justice Alito 
was right to contend that knowing when one “enabl[es] or  
facilitat[es] the commission of an immoral act by another” is a 
“difficult and important question.”152 Thus, some jurists and 
scholars contend that these claims should be treated no differ-
ently than moral ones, which is to say, with great deference.153 
 
 150 See Brief for Respondents, Sebelius v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, Docket No 13-354, 
*4–5 (US filed Oct 21, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 5720377). 
 151 See Gilardi, 926 F Supp 2d at 281–83.  
 152 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778. 
 153 See, for example, Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 565 (Flaum dissenting) (“[B]y putting 
substantial pressure on Notre Dame to act in ways that (as the university sees it) involve 
the university in the provision of contraceptives, I believe that the accommodation [ ] 
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Others maintain that the extent of the implication determines 
the substantiality of the burden, and therefore that questions as 
to the extent of the connection fall squarely within a court’s pur-
view.154 Which of these positions should we prefer? 
To begin answering that question, note that some relational 
claims of complicity are clearly too far-fetched to tolerate. We 
would hardly grant an exemption from having to subsidize some 
medical treatment because the objector worried that the treat-
ment would cause its recipient to grow horns and a tail. Nor 
should our solicitude extend this far. Although causal claims are 
metaphysical rather than empirical,155 there are causal “facts”—
claims of causal connection that, for the purposes of practical 
reasoning, we take to be no less true than empirical facts. 
Among these facts are what philosopher David Hume calls  
“constant conjunctions”—pairs of events in which the first al-
ways precedes the second (for example, you flip the switch and 
the light turns on).156 However, the connection between adminis-
tering the medical treatment in question and the patient’s grow-
ing horns and a tail does not even count as a constant conjunc-
tion. Indeed, in no instance has anyone grown horns and a tail 
after receiving any medical treatment. A rough rule of thumb 
might then be the following: assertions of supposed causal connec-
tions that have never been documented and for which there is uni-
form contradictory evidence need not be accorded any deference. 
Similarly, we should also reject those relational claims that 
amount to pleas that the objector should be less responsible than 
standard legal or moral theories would allow. For example, we 
should not permit someone who has intentionally facilitated a 
crime to evade conviction because he operates with an unusually 
 
runs afoul of RFRA.”) (emphasis added); Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious 
Exercises under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate Cases, 99 Va L Rev 
Online 10, 16 (2013) (arguing that the fact that a religious employer’s effect on contra-
ceptive use is attenuated—because employees decide whether they will use the method 
in question—should be irrelevant for a RFRA analysis, and instead that all that should 
be required is that the religious belief be sincerely held). 
 154 See Part I.B. 
 155 Notice that we arrive at causal claims on the basis of inductive reasoning: event 
B has always followed event A, nature is uniform, and so we should expect future occur-
rences of A to be followed by B. The constant regularity of “A then B” licenses our conclu-
sion that A causes B. See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 
40–54 (Oxford 1999) (Tom L. Beauchamp, ed). 
 156 Id at 86. For the view that at least some causal claims are necessarily true,  
rather than simply inferred by induction, see generally Ted Honderich, 1 Mind and 
Brain: A Theory of Determinism (Oxford 1988). 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
2015] Conscience and Complicity 1937 
 
narrow conception of complicity—say, one that requires that he 
function as a sufficient cause of the crime in order for him to be 
found guilty.157 Even if this narrower conception is mandated by 
his religious convictions, our fidelity to the law counsels reject-
ing it. A person who repudiates the theories of responsibility on 
which legal liability turns poses a far greater challenge than the 
run-of-the-mill conscientious objector, whose opposition is di-
rected to a discrete set of laws, typically encompassing just a 
small area of regulation. The challenge arises because the objec-
tion of the former targets modes of liability, and these cut across 
numerous legal domains—torts, criminal law, and regulatory vi-
olations (everything from traffic laws to environmental and fi-
nancial regulations), among others. His is an anarchic challenge, 
as he effectively attempts to immunize himself from all legal 
censure and thereby seeks to be treated as “a law unto him-
self.”158 At the same time, he is not completely without respect 
for the rule of law—after all, he is seeking an exemption through 
legal channels. (Were he to flout even these, there would be  
reason to think him unfit for political society.) His exemption 
should be denied, again because recognizing his conception of 
complicity would place him above the law altogether.159 
But what of the paradigmatic cases of conscientious objec-
tion, in which the objector takes himself to be more responsible 
than the law would have it? This is just the nature of the claim 
at issue in the contraceptive-mandate challenges: there, the re-
ligious adherent believes that subsidizing insurance through 
which someone else can commit a wrong sufficiently connects 
the subsidizer to the wrong to make him complicit. In the next 
Part, we will see that that relationship is not one that the law or 
standard moral theories recognize as a ground of complicity. One 
might think that fidelity to the law should decide the issue here, 
 
 157 Such a view would, I presume, rule out accomplice liability altogether; the only 
“accomplices” on this view would be coperpetrators. Of course, the defendant who would 
seek to prevail on these grounds would have to contend not only that his religion con-
strued complicity more narrowly but also that his religion mandated that he not permit 
himself to be subject to a more expansive conception—perhaps on the ground that any 
wider sense of responsibility would thwart the freedom that he requires to live out his 
individuality, as his religion conceives of it. Though not typically rooted in religion, we 
might think of libertarians’ or objectivists’ resistance to positive obligations as residing 
along something like these lines. See, for example, Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness: 
A New Concept of Egoism 30–35 (Signet 1964). 
 158 Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 166–67 (1878). 
 159 See id at 167 (contending that “[g]overnment could exist only in name” if reli-
gious adherents were permitted to escape foundational legal tenets). 
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just as it does in the case of the person who operates with an 
unusually narrow conception of responsibility. But two consider-
ations should give us pause. First, this objector does not pose a 
challenge to the rule of law; if anything, he holds himself to a 
more demanding standard than the law’s. Second, and on the 
other hand, applying our law to him affirms the values under-
pinning our own conception of complicity—in particular, the 
value of individual freedom that functions to keep notions of 
complicity within bounds that are believed to be reasonable. And 
indeed, if these bounds were entirely reasonable, we would be 
right to think that they should prevail. But there is in fact  
reason to doubt the cogency of the legal conception of complici-
ty—reason enough to put the religious adherent’s conception on 
an equal footing with the law’s. I turn now to surveying the legal 
conception, and then I offer a critique of that conception in 
Part III.  
II.  COMPLICITY IN LAW AND ETHICS 
In this Part, I argue that the conception of complicity in 
standard legal and moral accounts is far narrower than the con-
ception that the mandate opponents wielded. Had the Court ap-
plied the law’s conception of complicity in Hobby Lobby, it would 
have rejected the owners’ claim. This argument turns on a com-
parison between paying taxes to fund measures some of which 
the taxpayer opposes and paying an insurance company to pro-
vide health-care coverage some of which the subsidizer opposes. 
I seek to establish here that these two practices are morally on 
par. Given that the law declines to recognize tax resistance, I 
conclude that, as a matter of applying the law consistently, it 
should also decline to recognize challenges to the employer 
mandate. Importantly, the claim at issue here is interpretive, 
not normative. In Part III, I provide reasons for thinking that 
courts should treat both tax resistance and insurance challenges 
more deferentially than they currently do. The ambition in this 
Part, however, is more modest: I aim to show that the legal con-
ception of complicity and that of the conscientious objectors di-
verge. It is the idiosyncratic nature of the latter that requires 
that courts decide whether to defer to their conception or instead 
to insist on the one that the law embodies. 
When it comes to conscientious objection, the law distin-
guishes between direct participation and remote facilitation, 
treating the former as compelling and the latter as negligible. 
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This can be clearly seen in the case of pacifistic objections to the 
military: the law tends to accord an exemption to the pacifist 
when he would be made to participate in the war effort,160 but it 
denies an exemption to the pacifist who would withhold the por-
tion of his taxes that would fund military expenditures.161 By the 
lights of the law, participating in a war is recognizably uncon-
scionable for the pacifistic conscript; funding a war is not.162 In a 
similar vein, taxpayers are made to fund capital punishment 
and government-subsidized abortions no matter their moral or 
religious qualms about one or both of these practices.163 And sim-
ilar reasons undergird the rule that students may be compelled 
 
 160 The US military recognizes two classes of conscientious objectors: first, those who 
oppose only combat; and second, those who oppose all military service. In the event of a 
draft, the first class of conscientious objectors will have to serve in the armed forces, but 
they will be exempt from all training or duties involving the use of weapons. The second 
class will be exempt from all military activity, but they will have to pursue alternative 
service (for example, working with the very young or elderly). See generally Fast Facts: 
Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service (Selective Service System, Apr 30, 2002), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8Q9M-FN2U. It is worth noting that military service, while 
perhaps the most familiar locus for successful conscientious objection, is not the only  
area in which the law grants exemptions. Religious objectors may be excused from jury 
service (when they take seriously the Bible’s prohibition on judging another). See In re 
Jenison, 125 NW2d 588, 590 (Minn 1963) (reversing the petitioner’s contempt conviction 
for refusing to serve on a jury). Further, laws permitting controversial medical proce-
dures exempt physicians who object to these procedures on moral or religious grounds. 
See, for example, 18 Vt Stat Ann § 5285(a) (“A physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other 
person shall not be under any duty, by law or contract, to participate in the provision of a 
lethal dose of medication to a patient.”). 
 161 See, for example, Autenrieth v Cullen, 418 F2d 586, 588 (9th Cir 1969) (“The fact 
that some persons may object, on religious grounds, to some of the things that the gov-
ernment does is not a basis upon which they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a 
part of the tax.”); Lull v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 602 F2d 1166, 1167 (4th Cir 
1979); Graves v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 579 F2d 392, 393–94 (6th Cir 1978). 
See also United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) (rejecting a religiously based objec-
tion to social security taxes on the ground that “religious belief in conflict with the pay-
ment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax”); Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 354 
(cited in note 35) (noting that “when [taxpayers’] protests are aimed at general  
taxation”—that is, all taxes, and not just those funding a particular initiative that some 
taxpayers oppose—then their “First Amendment interests are significantly attenuated, 
and the government’s interest in promoting its policies will ordinarily be sufficient to  
overcome them”) (emphasis omitted). 
 162 But see Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1849), excerpted in Scott J. 
Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick, and Howard L. Lubert, eds, 1 Classics of American Polit-
ical and Constitutional Thought: Origins through the Civil War 932, 935 (Hackett 2007):  
I have heard some of my townsmen say, “I should like to have them order me 
out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico;—see 
if I would go;” and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, 
and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. 
 163 See Zach Carter, Catholic Bishops’ Contraception Coverage Argument Ridiculed by 
Pacifist Activists (Huffington Post, Feb 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/UR9K-UV28. 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
1940  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1897 
   
to pay fees that support university services that they oppose, 
like abortion provision or counseling—again, because the objecting 
students are considered too remotely connected to those services.164 
Insurance subsidization is like the payment of taxes because 
it too relates the subsidizer to the party engaging in the objec-
tionable conduct in an attenuated and mediated way. More spe-
cifically, the connection between Hobby Lobby’s contribution to 
its employees’ health insurance plans and its employees’ use of 
one of the four contested contraceptive methods is not stronger 
in a meaningful sense than the connection between a taxpayer’s 
contribution to, say, Medicaid and a Medicaid subscriber’s use of 
one of these methods.165 The components of the health-care 
package were chosen by the government, just as the expendi-
tures that tax dollars fund are chosen by the government. Fur-
ther, it is notable that courts have rejected religious objections 
to the ACA’s individual mandate because they find the objector’s 
connection to the health care that others in the insurance pool 
receive to be too attenuated to warrant an exemption.166 To be 
sure, Hobby Lobby pays for a greater proportion of its employees’ 
health care than any taxpayer pays for a Medicaid subscriber’s 
health care (or for the health care of others in the same insur-
ance pool). But brute dollar amounts cannot be said to make a 
relevant difference167—after all, we do not think that wealthy 
individuals who pay more taxes are for that reason more impli-
cated by government conduct. 
Courts fail to take seriously taxpayer complicity not because 
the amount any taxpayer pays to fund some initiative is vanish-
ingly small, but because there are too many steps in the causal 
 
 164 See Erzinger v Regents of University of California, 187 Cal Rptr 164, 167–68 (Cal 
App 1982). 
 165 See Sepper, 22 Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 329–30 (cited in note 44) (“Doc-
trine dictates that contributions to insurance fall into a zone of limited responsibility 
and, therefore, do not significantly burden religious freedom.”). 
 166 See, for example, Mead v Holder, 766 F Supp 2d 16, 42 (DDC 2011), affd, Seven-
Sky v Holder, 661 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2011), overruled by National Federation of Independent 
Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) (“Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts 
demonstrating that this conflict is more than a de minimis burden on their Christian 
faith.”). This portion of the opinion was affirmed by the DC Circuit. Seven-Sky, 661 F3d 
at 5 & n 4. See also Sepper, 22 Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 330 (cited in note 44) 
(“Until now, courts have consistently dismissed the burden imposed on religious objec-
tors by insurance programs as both attenuated and justified by compelling government 
interests.”).  
 167 But see Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 678 (DC Cir 2008) (“An inconse-
quential or de minimis burden on religious practice does not rise to th[e] level [of a sub-
stantial burden].”).  
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chain between the taxpayer’s payment of taxes and the pursuit 
of the activity he deplores. For example, in some of the cases in-
volving taxpayer resistance to military spending, the resisting 
taxpayer looks at the percentage of the federal budget devoted to 
military spending—say, 39 percent in some years168—and he de-
ducts that amount from his total tax burden, sometimes offering 
to contribute that money to a charitable organization unrelated 
to war.169 Thirty-nine percent of a person’s tax burden is not an 
insignificant amount. And yet courts do not welcome those 
claims for a partial exemption from one’s tax burden any more 
than they do other claims, when the amount of money the objec-
tor would contribute to the initiative he opposes is considerably 
less. Nor should it make a difference under the law that Hobby 
Lobby has an interest in its employees’ spiritual standing (their 
souls) that is stronger than the taxpayer’s interest in the spir-
itual standing of his fellow citizens, for this is not the kind of in-
terest of which courts will take cognizance.170 
In sum, given the considerations that the law takes to be 
relevant—considerations that turn largely on the proximity be-
tween the objector and the conduct to which he objects—there is 
no distinction between employer-subsidized health care and  
taxpayer-subsidized health care. If taxpayers are taken to be too 
remotely connected to the initiatives they fund to count as com-
plicit, then so too employers should be taken to be too remotely 
connected to their employees’ contraception use to count as com-
plicit. On the basis of proximity considerations, then, the legal 
understanding of complicity would have compelled rejection of 
Hobby Lobby’s objections. 
Moreover, ethics and law align here. Thus, proximity con-
siderations inform moral judgments as to whether someone is in 
fact complicit in conduct that he opposes. For example, in evalu-
ating claims of complicity to participating in the sale of the 
morning-after pill, Professor Kent Greenawalt has considered 
 
 168 See Anup Shah, World Military Spending (Global Issues, June 30, 2013),  
archived at http://perma.cc/Q9QZ-RNHN. 
 169 See, for example, Robert T. Pennock, Death and Taxes: On the Justice of Consci-
entious War Tax Resistance, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol 124, 127–28 (1998). 
 170 See Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 552 (“[W]hile a religious institution has a broad im-
munity from being required to engage in acts that violate the tenets of its faith, it has no 
right to prevent other institutions, whether the government or a health insurance com-
pany, from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution.”); Lyng v Northwest  
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 US 439, 450–52 (1988); Bowen v Roy, 476 
US 693, 699–700 (1986). 
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the relative strength of objections raised by the pharmacist, a 
drugstore clerk, and a cashier, and he has concluded that 
“[t]here comes a point at which an individual’s involvement is so 
remote, a right to refuse seems excessive.”171 Other moral philos-
ophers agree, both with respect to the pharmacist’s case172 and 
with respect to claims of taxpayer complicity.173 
Nor is it surprising that the prevailing conception of com-
plicity among moral philosophers is narrow. Moral philosophical 
accounts of responsibility are predominantly individualistic.174 
 
 171 Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They 
Be Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L Rev 47, 57 (2010). See also id at 60:  
I do not think everyone remotely connected to patients, including those who 
type their forms, make their beds, dish out their meals, and clean their rooms, 
should have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the patient 
undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote. 
 172 See, for example, Eva LaFollette and Hugh LaFollette, Private Conscience, Pub-
lic Acts, 33 J Med Ethics 249, 253 (2007); Robert F. Card, Conscientious Objection and 
Emergency Contraception, 7 Am J Bioethics 8, 11 (2007) (“[I]t is simply unreasonable to 
withhold medication because of the mere possibility that [assisting patients] may con-
tribute to an immoral result.”). 
 173 See, for example, Dan W. Brock, Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and Phar-
macists: Who Is Obligated to Do What, and Why?, 29 Theoretical Med & Bioethics 187, 
197 (2008): 
Suppose, as I and many others believe, that thousands of innocent Iraqis have 
died unjustly in the Iraq war. Donald Rumsfeld’s complicity in those deaths is 
great; senators who voted to authorize President Bush to initiate the war have 
complicity that is significant though lesser; ordinary citizens whose tax dollars 
help pay for the war have complicity that is minimal at most. 
 174 See, for example, Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J Phil 674, 674 
(1968) (“[I]n the standard case of responsibility for harm, there can be no liability with-
out contributory fault.”); Kutz, Complicity at 3–7 (cited in note 75) (describing the para-
digmatic principle of responsibility in Anglo-American law and ethics as the “individual 
difference principle,” which holds that “I am only accountable for a harm if something I 
did made a difference to its occurrence,” and arguing, convincingly, that this principle is 
gravely in need of supplementation); H.D. Lewis, The Non-moral Notion of Collective Re-
sponsibility, in Peter A. French, ed, Individual and Collective Responsibility: Massacre at 
My Lai 119, 121 (Cambridge 1972) (“[N]o one can be responsible, in the properly ethical 
sense, for the conduct of another.”). Legal accounts also embrace an individualistic con-
ception. See, for example, Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibil-
ity, 49 Am J Comp L 455, 468 (2001) (anointing as sacrosanct “the principle that convic-
tion and sentence for a morally disqualifying crime should be related to the actor’s own 
conduct and culpability”); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability 
for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J Intl Crim Just 
619, 633 (2007) (“[N]o one, in fact, can be punished for a wrongful act unless the act is 
attributable to him.”); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 1–3 
(1988) (noting this feature of American jurisprudence and arguing that it reflects only 
men’s existential experiences). See also Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical 
Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J L & Polit 183, 189 (2006):  
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Individuals bear responsibility on these accounts only for what 
they do, and only to the extent that what they do causes harm.175 
This narrow understanding of responsibility is taken to be a 
necessary corollary of liberalism’s commitment to individual 
freedom: more-expansive conceptions of responsibility, especially 
when these would license blame or sanction, threaten to limit 
too much action and therefore to be too restrictive. So it is that 
there is a general inclination in the Western philosophical canon 
to overlook or even deny claims that an upstream agent can bear 
moral responsibility for a downstream event, particularly when 
other agents intervene in—and thereby rupture—the causal 
chain by interposing their own intentions or decisions.176 Thus, 
on these accounts, a gun seller is not responsible for a gun buy-
er’s murder of the latter’s nemesis, because the buyer’s decision 
to kill functions as an intervening event breaking the causal 
chain between the gun sale and the murder. And as we have 
seen, commentators and jurists adduce a similar line of argu-
ment in the contraceptive-mandate challenges, contending that 
an employee’s decision to buy the morning-after pill (or another 
form of contraception) eclipses her employer’s responsibility for 
her use of contraceptives.177 
Given the role that proximity plays in these cases, it seems 
clear that Hobby Lobby’s objection to the contraceptive mandate 
fails as a matter of the standard moral and legal understandings 
of complicity.178 Morally, the fact that it is employees who decide 
to use contraception would be taken to absolve Hobby Lobby 
(and, a fortiori, its owners) of responsibility for that contracep-
tive use. And legally, the principled rationale for prohibiting 
taxpayer resistance179 would seem to apply with equal force to 
 
[The individualist] conception of responsibility [is one] that American law has 
made familiar to us. On this conception, responsibility is limited to the indi-
vidual’s contribution, and liability may be imposed on an individual only for 
her actions, and only to the extent that these wrongfully caused the injury to 
be redressed. 
 175 See Kutz, Complicity at 3 (cited in note 75). 
 176 See Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law at 82–83 (cited in note 72). 
 177 See, for example, Smith and Corbin, Debate, 161 U Pa L Rev Online at 271 (cited 
in note 48); Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 178 See Jay Michaelson, Why Hobby Lobby Will Be Bad for Conservatives (The Daily 
Beast, June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EM2H-PP99 (“[The owners’] causal 
nexus is so thin as to be basically nonexistent. [They] can be responsible for anything.”). 
 179 There is, of course, an administrative rationale for prohibiting tax resistance: the 
tax system as a whole would falter if taxpayers could opt out of paying taxes for any ini-
tiative that they opposed. But that rationale is not decisive. Courts routinely invoke  
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pleas for religiously based exemptions from mandatory insur-
ance subsidization. 
Before moving on, it is worth underscoring that the claim in 
this Part has been conditional in two respects. First, the delib-
erations here have been aimed at showing how Hobby Lobby 
would have come out if the Court had applied the understanding 
of complicity contained in the law (which itself follows the un-
derstanding in standard moral accounts), rather than the more 
capacious understanding of complicity that the owners ad-
vanced. We have seen that, under the legal understanding of 
complicity, Hobby Lobby’s connection to the asserted wrong 
would be too tenuous to render it complicit in “embryo destruc-
tion” simply on the basis of providing health insurance that in-
cluded so-called abortifacients. Nor would the result have been 
different had Hobby Lobby instead opposed all methods of con-
traception, or different medical interventions altogether (for ex-
ample, blood transfusions, treatments derived from embryonic 
stem cells, and so forth). The relevant considerations contem-
plate not how much health care the objecting subsidizer funds but 
how strong the connection is between the objecting subsidizer and 
the conduct that he opposes. Again, given the law’s fixation on 
proximity, the connection created by the employer mandate 
would not be deemed strong enough. 
The claim that I defend is conditional in a second sense, as 
well: if proximity is relevant to determining when courts should 
grant exemptions, then the mandate cases should be decided no 
differently from the tax-resistance cases. In the next Part, I take 
issue with the role that proximity plays in law and ethics and 
thereby seek to show that the antecedent in this second condi-
tional is problematic. 
III.  THE TROUBLING ROLE OF PROXIMITY IN COMPLICITY 
DETERMINATIONS 
Our standard thinking about complicity, in both law and 
ethics, relies to a significant extent on considerations of proximi-
ty for purposes of distinguishing among different complicity 
claims on the basis of their strength. In this Part, I aim to estab-
lish that proximity does indeed play this role and to argue that 
it is a misleading guide when it comes to conscientious objection. 
 
concerns about attenuation in justifying their decisions to deny tax relief on conscien-
tious grounds. See notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
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Part III.A contains the argument for the claim that proximity 
does a good deal of work in the adjudication of complicity claims 
in both ethics and the law. In Part III.B, I ascertain what is  
really at stake for the conscientious objector: Why is participa-
tion in an act that he opposes so difficult for him? I contend that 
the fact of our agency does make a difference to us; we do not 
want to be connected to an act we deem wrong, even if our con-
nection is compelled by law and even if the outcome will be the 
same whether or not we participate. Yet concerns for our own 
implication can be—reasonably—insensitive to degree: even 
when there may, in some cases, be good reasons to see oneself as 
more or less implicated in an act given the strength of one’s 
causal connection to it, there may, in other cases, be good  
reasons to overlook proximity considerations, as I argue in Part 
III.C. In Part III.D, I apply the insights of the previous sections 
to the employer-mandate case and I argue that, given the 
amount of deference that complicity claims deserve, considera-
tions of proximity underdetermine the proper response to re-
quests for exemptions. We shall see that we are without the  
resources to arrive at fine and firm distinctions among different 
claims of complicity. I conclude that if we are to decide which of 
these claims the law should recognize, we will have to look  
beyond the merits of a given complicity claim and instead to the 
effects of an exemption on others. 
A. Proximity as the Prevailing Criterion for Conscientious 
Objection 
We have seen that courts generally reject claims of conscien-
tious objection to particular tax expenditures.180 The rationale 
for denying citizens a right to opt out of paying the portion of 
their taxes funding initiatives to which they object is, in part, 
avowedly administrative—the whole tax system would falter if 
the government were made to carve out exceptions to the myriad 
governmental expenditures that some individual or another  
opposes on moral or religious grounds.181 As the Court has noted, 
 
 180 The exception here arises in cases in which the contested government expendi-
ture would constitute an Establishment Clause violation. See Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 
104 (1968) (noting that the “Establishment Clause . . . operates as a specific constitu-
tional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power”). 
 181 See United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) (contending that the “tax system 
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax 
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief”); Autenrieth v  
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“the proper and efficient exercise of [the tax function] may some-
times entail the possibility of encroachment upon individual 
freedom.”182 The Court has also expressed separation of powers 
concerns, rejecting the objecting taxpayers’ claims not on the 
merits but rather on standing grounds.183 And scholars adduce 
another principled rationale for denying taxpayers a right to 
withhold taxes that would fund initiatives that they find objec-
tionable: these expenditures, like all government expenditures, 
result from established democratic means.184 Today’s tax levies 
do not involve “taxation without representation”;185 instead, it is 
“our own duly elected governmental officials who imposed these 
taxes.”186 Put differently, what it means to live in a democracy is 
to recognize that one’s policy preferences will not always prevail, 
and that one is under an obligation to obey the law even if one’s 
preferences have not prevailed.187 
Yet while all these considerations provide a partial explana-
tion for the law’s refusal to countenance conscientious taxpayer 
resistance, they do not—either alone or in combination—fully 
account for that refusal. The law already permits taxpayers to 
 
Cullen, 418 F2d 586, 588–89 (9th Cir 1969) (“If every citizen could refuse to pay all or 
part of his taxes because he disapproved of the government’s use of the money, on reli-
gious grounds, the ability of the government to function could be impaired or even  
destroyed.”). 
 182 Bates v City of Little Rock, 361 US 516, 524–25 (1960). See also Kornhauser, 
1999 Wis L Rev at 972 (cited in note 6). 
 183 See, for example, Flast, 392 US at 114 (Stewart concurring) (“[A] taxpayer may 
not ‘employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about 
the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.’”); United 
States v Richardson, 418 US 166, 177 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 US 633, 633–34 (1937); 
Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 487 (1923). 
 184 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 
494 US 872, 890 (1990):  
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must 
be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in 
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of 
all religious beliefs. 
 185 Pennock, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol at 132 (cited in note 169) (raising this 
argument as a hypothetical objection to his own position, which is that conscientious ob-
jection to war taxes should be permissible). See also generally Moody-Adams, Democratic 
Conflict (cited in note 113). 
 186 Pennock, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol at 132 (cited in note 169).  
 187 See Sullivan, 59 U Chi L Rev at 222 (cited in note 15) (“[W]hile financial support 
is withdrawn from religion, religionists may still be required to give financial support to 
the state, for all religions gain from the truce and the common goods of the civil public 
order it established.”). 
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contest government expenditures that violate constitutional con-
straints on government activity, most notably in the Establishment 
Clause context.188 If the tax system can withstand these challenges, 
then it can presumably withstand at least some others, too.189 Sim-
ilarly, if courts are equipped to weigh the merits of tax objec-
tions in the Establishment Clause context, then surely they can 
weigh the merits of at least some other tax objections, too—
especially those that are based on conscience and thus are not 
“generalized grievances”190 or injuries that are “indefinite [and 
held] in common with people generally.”191 Finally, the fact that 
the contested government expenditures were chosen through  
legitimate democratic means fails as a justification for similar 
reasons, because exemptions are granted for other government 
measures whose democratic pedigrees are no less venerable. For 
example, the pacifist who seeks an exemption from the draft 
lodges an objection to a war effort that Congress authorized. 
The consideration that tips the scale against most cases of 
taxpayer resistance, then, must lie elsewhere—namely, in con-
siderations of the proximity between the objector’s conduct and 
the result or activity to which he objects. Thus, as we have seen, 
the connection between taxpayers and the government initia-
tives they oppose has been deemed too remote or attenuated to 
warrant an exemption.192 And remoteness here is not simply a 
factor bearing on the justiciability of the complaint.193 It is in-
stead a finding on the merits that the burden on the taxpayer is 
too negligible or too far removed from an activity that is im-
portant to the adherent’s religious scheme.194 
Moreover, considerations of proximity underpin not only the 
differential treatment accorded to pacifistic military conscripts 
and tax resisters but other complicity determinations as well. 
 
 188 See Flast, 392 US at 102–03 (establishing a two-part test whereby a plaintiff can 
establish standing to sue the government for an unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds). 
 189 To soften the blow, the government could mandate that the objecting taxpayers 
direct the portion of their taxes that would have gone to the objectionable activity to 
some other initiative, like the Peace Corps or Head Start. See Pennock, 1 J Accounting, 
Ethics & Pub Pol at 141 & n 34 (cited in note 169). 
 190 Flast, 392 US at 106. 
 191 Mellon, 262 US at 488. 
 192 See note 161 and accompanying text.  
 193 See Mellon, 262 US at 487 (“[A]ny payment out of the funds [is] so remote, fluc-
tuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of 
a court of equity.”). 
 194 See Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 678 (DC Cir 2008) (denying a claim on 
the ground that the burden on the objector was “de minimis”). 
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Thus, proximity explains law and morality’s greater tolerance 
for physicians who assist suicide (legal in some states) relative 
to those who engage in euthanasia (illegal in all states), as well 
as the greater protection afforded to pharmacists who refuse to 
fill prescriptions for the morning-after pill but not to pharmacy 
clerks who refuse to ring up the bill for customers waiting to 
pick up their morning-after pill prescriptions.195 Yet it is not 
clear that considerations of proximity are relevant to the objec-
tor, nor that they should be, as I now endeavor to show. 
B. The Grounds of Conscientious Objection 
I begin with a relatively uncontroversial case of conscien-
tious objection—that of the physician who refuses to perform 
abortions on moral or religious grounds. Doctors who object to 
abortion on moral or religious grounds may, without penalty, re-
fuse to perform abortions. This is a well-established right of 
physicians,196 and it is met with virtually no objection on the 
part of the public. Yet notwithstanding the widespread  
acceptance of conscientious objection in the case of abortion pro-
vision,197 it is surprisingly difficult to identify or articulate the ra-
tionale for accommodating the physician’s objection. Especially if 
we know that the outcome will be the same no matter whether 
the objecting physician participates (if he will not, the patient 
can find another provider who will) and especially given that 
doctors bear a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their 
 
 195 See Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1465–66 (cited in note 18): 
In the health care context, an Iowa Attorney General Opinion concluded that 
the state’s abortion conscience clause extended by its terms only to those who 
“recommend[ ], perform[ ], or assist[ ] in an abortion procedure.” Consequently, 
nurses who provide comfort to a patient and pharmacists who prepare the sa-
line solution used in abortions could not use the conscience clause to refrain 
from doing their jobs. 
 196 See Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at 1503 (cited in note 45); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal 
Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J Clinical Ethics 163, 165 & 
n 38 (2010) (collecting laws from states that permit doctors to refuse to perform abortions 
on moral or religious grounds); State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services 
*3 (Guttmacher Institute, Nov 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T5C5-SYEL (same). 
 197 I assume that the situation is not one in which the woman faces an imminent 
threat to her health or life such that she would not have time to find another doctor if 
the first one refused. See Committee on Ethics, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal at *1 
(cited in note 141) (“In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively 
have an impact on a patient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to 
provide medically indicated and requested care.”). 
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patients,198 why permit the physician to refuse? Why not just 
think the objecting physician’s concern precious and, worse still, 
violative of the commitment to his patient’s welfare that forms 
the backbone of his profession?199 
The answer, it turns out, depends on the special value that 
each of us attaches to our own agency. In general, it is a moral 
commonplace that no one should be made to participate in an 
act that he deems immoral. We safeguard people from such par-
ticipation because we recognize that, from the perspective of the 
actor, it makes a difference that the wrong occurs through his 
hands, even if he knows that the wrong will occur whether or 
not it is he who brings it about. 
The interest at stake for an individual in keeping his own 
hands clean can be understood in several ways. On a narrative 
account, the idea might be that one has an interest in having a 
life story that does not include an episode in which one acted 
against one’s convictions.200 The notion of moral integrity and its 
role in constituting one’s identity might also capture what is at 
stake.201 Thus, Professor Dan Brock writes: 
 
 198  In general, a fiduciary must “promote the interests of [the] beneficiar[y] rather 
than [the fiduciary’s] own interests.” Sharona Hoffman and Jessica Wilen Berg, The 
Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U Pitt L Rev 365, 393 (2005). The doctor is a fiduciary to 
his patients. See Thomas L. Hafemeister and Richard M. Gulbrandsen Jr, The Fiduciary 
Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” If an “Informed” Patient Demands Services 
That Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 Seton Hall L Rev 335, 369 & nn 171–72 (2009) (col-
lecting cases in which courts have noted that the physician bears a fiduciary relationship 
to his patients). 
 199 See Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth Edition, 
156 Annals Internal Med 73, 75 (2012) (“The physician’s primary commitment must al-
ways be to the patient’s welfare and best interests.”). 
 200 This idea is given a powerful evocation in a hypothetical that might seem far 
afield of the example here—namely, one in which a lorry driver hits and kills a child 
through no fault of the driver’s. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck 27–30 (Cambridge 
1981). Given that the driver is not responsible for the accident, one might expect his re-
action to the child’s death to be no different from that of an onlooker who witnesses the 
scene. Not so, however, Professor Bernard Williams explains: the driver’s agency has 
been implicated in the death in a way that the bystander’s has not. Id at 30. The driver’s 
biography has been punctuated by this tragic event—it figures in the narrative of his life 
in a way different from the way that it will figure in the life of a mere bystander to the 
event. For this reason, in addition to caring about the child’s fate, the driver has reason 
to care that it was he who brought about this fate. See Susan Wolf, The Moral of Moral 
Luck, 31 Philosophic Exchange 4, 9 (2001) (“What is problematic is [the lorry driver’s] 
failure . . . to take the consequences of his faultiness to have consequences for him, to be 
a significant part of his personal history, in a way in which witnessing, much less read-
ing about an accident would not be.”). 
 201 See Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at 1529 (cited in note 45) (“[A] number of scholars have 
argued [that] an individual’s moral integrity offers the most compelling moral basis for 
respecting her conscience.”); Chapman, 2013 U Ill L Rev at 1494 (cited in note 114) (“[A]s 
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Deeply held and important moral judgments of conscience 
constitute the central bases of individuals’ moral integrity; 
they define who, at least morally speaking, the individual is, 
what she stands for, what is the central moral core of her 
character. Maintaining her moral integrity then requires 
that she not violate her moral commitments and gives oth-
ers reason to respect her doing so . . . because the mainte-
nance of moral integrity is an important value, central to 
one’s status as a moral person.202  
Or, again, in a more existentialist vein, one might say that one 
is what one does, and one’s actions instantiate one’s values in 
the world and so stand as beacons for others in discerning right 
from wrong.203 At bottom, all these understandings are about 
meaning—how we construct meaning for and about ourselves in 
light of what we do in the world.204 
Notice, though, that once we locate the reason to grant an 
accommodation to others in a quest for meaning, it becomes  
difficult to judge some assertions of complicity to be more or less 
legitimate than others. From a first person perspective, other 
factors may occlude proximity considerations in determining 
 
many theorists have noted, protecting conscience promotes obedience to conscience, 
which in turn promotes personal integrity.”). For statements of conscience that speak to 
personal integrity, see Hannah Arendt, 1 The Life of the Mind: Thinking 181 (Harcourt 
Brace 1978) (quoting Socrates’s explanation for his civil disobedience: “It would be better 
. . . that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should 
be out of harmony with myself and contradict me”); Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird 
105 (Warner Books 1960) (quoting Atticus Finch as saying, “before I can live with other 
folks I’ve got to live with myself ”) (emphasis added). See also Rawls, Political Liberalism 
at 312–13 (cited in note 115) (defending “liberty of conscience” in light of its relationship 
to our conception of the good, which includes a sense of self-awareness—we come to 
know “why . . . our ends [are] good and suitable for us”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of 
Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 19 (Basic Books 2008) 
(referring to conscience as the “faculty in human beings with which they search for life’s 
ultimate meaning”).  
 202 Brock, 29 Theoretical Med & Bioethics at 189 (cited in note 173). See also J.  
David Bleich, The Physician as a Conscientious Objector, 30 Fordham Urban L J 245, 245 
(2002) (“[T]o demand of a physician that she act in a manner she deems to be morally  
unpalatable not only compromises the physician’s ethical integrity, but is also likely to 
have a corrosive effect upon the dedication and zeal with which she ministers to  
patients.”). 
 203 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism 20–23 (Yale 2007) (John 
Kulka, ed) (Carol Macomber, trans).  
 204 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hobby Lobby supports the relationship  
between conscience and meaning, although his comments are restricted to religious free-
dom rather than freedom of conscience more generally. Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2785 
(Kennedy concurring) (“For [religious adherents], free exercise is essential in preserving 
their own dignity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by their religious precepts.”). 
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how complicit a person feels or even has reason to feel. Or so I 
shall now argue, by examining cases in which proximity is a 
poor guide for discerning the magnitude of one’s responsibility 
for someone else’s conduct to which one contributes.  
C. Proximity versus First Person Perceptions of Complicity 
Law and morality agree that it is worse for a doctor to kill a 
patient than for a doctor to give the patient the means to kill 
himself (typically, with a lethal dose of medicine that the patient 
self-administers). That is, euthanasia is taken to be worse than 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS).205 It is for this reason that PAS 
is legal in some states whereas euthanasia is illegal every-
where.206 On what do these judgments rest? 
According to some commentators, proximity makes the rele-
vant difference.207 Yet much of the greater concern that eutha-
nasia invites results from considerations that bear only a con-
tingent connection to proximity. Instead, these are better cashed 
out as concerns for patient autonomy, and proximity is but a 
rough proxy for them. For example, we have reason to prefer 
PAS to euthanasia because it elides the worry that perhaps the 
patient was coerced, or that he had a change of heart that he 
was unable to communicate in time.208 If he self-administers the 
lethal drugs, we have greater reason to think that he was com-
mitted to ending his life.209 The question for our purposes,  
 
 205 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 732–33 (1997) (noting that one of the rea-
sons for prohibiting PAS is that legalized PAS could open the door to legalized euthanasia).  
 206 See, for example, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or Rev Stat § 127.800 
et seq. 
 207 See, for example, Timothy E. Quill, Christine K. Cassel, and Diane E. Meier, 
Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 
New Eng J Med 1380, 1381 (1992); Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs 
Amok, 22 Hastings Center Rep 52, 52 (Mar–Apr 1992) (arguing that euthanasia, unlike 
suicide, cannot be seen as an exercise of self-determination since euthanasia has some-
one else do the killing, and contending further that no one else can have the right to kill 
another, even with the other’s consent).  
 208 See Willem A. Landman, A Proposal for Legalizing Assisted Suicide and Eutha-
nasia in South Africa, in Loretta M. Kopelman and Kenneth A. De Ville, eds, Physician-
Assisted Suicide: What Are the Issues? 203, 211 (Kluwer Academic 2001). See also Glucksberg, 
521 US at 730–31 (describing the ways in which our certitude about the patient’s commit-
ment to ending his life might be undermined—for example, because he has not been ade-
quately treated for pain or because he is in a vulnerable position). 
 209 But see generally Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in Susan M. Wolf, ed, Feminism & Bioethics: Beyond 
Reproduction 282 (Oxford 1996) (arguing that, given the social and cultural norms cele-
brating or mandating self-sacrifice on the part of women, we have reason to doubt the 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
1952  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1897 
   
however, is whether there is an intrinsic moral difference be-
tween the two practices, not whether one is more likely to raise 
concerns in practice.210 Suppose that one could be confident that 
the patient in the euthanasia scenario is as committed to ending 
his life as the patient in the PAS scenario. Does the fact that eu-
thanasia has the physician administer the lethal medicine 
whereas PAS has the patient do so give the physician more  
reason to feel complicit in the former than the latter? 
One might think that a distinction between the two exists 
because, with euthanasia, the physician intends her patient’s 
death whereas in PAS the physician need intend only to facili-
tate her patient’s choice to die.211 But that way of describing the 
two practices is tendentious. The physician who offers euthanasia 
may intend only to facilitate her patient’s choice to die, too, and 
the physician who prescribes lethal medication that the patient 
will self-administer may intend by so doing to participate in 
bringing about her patient’s death. Given that the intention un-
derlying euthanasia and PAS may be the same, the difference 
between the two may then simply be one of means. 
This difference in means cannot sustain a moral distinction 
between the two practices. To see this, consider a stylized ver-
sion of the ways that euthanasia and PAS occur. Suppose that 
death in both occurs as a result of a lethal combination of medi-
cines that is administered through injection (euthanasia) or 
orally (PAS). Whichever route the patient chooses, his death will 
occur in the doctor’s office—either the doctor will administer the 
 
conviction of a gravely ill woman who professes to want to end her life, whether through 
euthanasia or PAS). 
 210 Those who consider the question from a utilitarian perspective will not recognize 
a difference between a practice’s practical consequences and its intrinsic moral status. 
Compare Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary 
Euthanasia, in John Keown, ed, Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Per-
spectives 225, 228–33 (Cambridge 1995) (suggesting that there is no difference between 
euthanasia and PAS on practical grounds), with John Deigh, Physician-Assisted Suicide 
and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences, 88 J Crim L & Crimin 1155, 
1164–65 (1998) (concluding that “utilitarian methods advise treating the two practices 
separately”). 
 211 See Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793, 802 (1997), quoting Assisted Suicide in the United 
States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) (“[I]n 
some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient’s death, but the physician’s purpose 
and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient’s pain. A doctor who assists a suicide, 
however, ‘must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made 
dead.’”). For an extended discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing, on moral grounds, 
an intention to omit treatment from acts of hastening death, see Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at 
1536–38 (cited in note 45).  
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injection in her office or she will hand the patient the pills and 
he will take them in her office. (The example is stylized because, 
with PAS, the physician provides the patient with a prescription 
for the lethal drugs, and the patient fills the prescription and 
then typically ingests the pills at home.)212 Arguably, at least, 
the injection has the physician participate more directly in the 
patient’s death than does the provision of the pills. But surely 
there can be no moral difference that turns on the difference in 
the method by which the lethal drugs enter the patient’s body.213 
The physician is not more morally implicated in the death when 
she administers a lethal injection that kills her patient than 
when she hands over the lethal pills and simply watches as the 
patient kills himself. (The same would hold true if what were at 
stake were a distinction between surgical and medical (that is, 
drug-induced) abortions in which either procedure took place in 
the doctor’s office with the doctor at the patient’s side.) 
Yet if there is no reason to distinguish morally between the 
euthanasia and PAS cases in the stylized versions just de-
scribed, why should we think that a distinction exists between 
euthanasia and PAS as the two typically occur—that is, with the 
former taking place in the doctor’s office, and the latter occur-
ring sometime after the doctor prescribes the lethal medications 
and in the doctor’s absence? The decision to end his life is no 
more the patient’s when it is effectuated in his home than when 
it is effectuated in the doctor’s office. Yet in the case in which 
the patient ingests the lethal drugs at home, the doctor is un-
doubtedly more removed—in space and time—from the patient’s 
death than she is in the euthanasia case. If the fact of greater 
distance in space and time does not entail a diminution in the 
physician’s moral responsibility—and for the foregoing reasons, 
I believe that it does not—then it must be that what matters in 
our thinking about any moral differences between euthanasia 
and PAS is not the extent of the doctor’s intervention in the pa-
tient’s death so much as it is the other concerns for which causal 
proximity might function as a proxy (for example, concerns 
 
 212 See Daniel Engber, How Does Assisted Suicide Work? (Slate, Oct 6, 2005),  
archived at http://perma.cc/D9MN-3XP5. 
 213 See John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy: An Argument against 
Legalisation 33 (Cambridge 2002) (“What, for example, is the supposed difference  
between a doctor handing a lethal pill to a patient; placing the pill on the patient’s 
tongue; and dropping it down the patient’s throat?”). 
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about whether the patient persists in his intent to die or wheth-
er he has been pressured).214 
What, then, of the pharmacist who objects to filling a pre-
scription for PAS? The pharmacist is situated differently from 
the physician: Doctor and patient share responsibility for the 
patient’s treatment choices, as physician and patient are appro-
priately regarded as a team. The doctor is not some mere com-
mercial purveyor and the patient does not merely play the role 
of consumer. Instead, doctor and patient decide together, in con-
sultation, on the best course of action for the patient.215 As such, 
the doctor is aligned with the patient’s treatment choices in a 
way that the pharmacist is not.216 Instead, the pharmacist who 
is handed a prescription for a lethal dose of medicine because 
the patient has elected, and has been certified for,217 PAS is like 
the gun merchant who is asked to sell a gun to someone who in-
tends to kill himself with it and who—let us imagine, for the 
purpose of more closely aligning the pharmacist and gun-
merchant  
cases—is also terminally ill and has also been certified for PAS. 
(Imagine further that the terminally ill gun buyer who intends 
to end his life prefers the drama of a gunshot to lethal sedation.) 
Both the pharmacist and gun merchant in these scenarios pro-
vide their customers with instruments that they know the cus-
tomer intends to use to end his life. And as a brute causal mat-
ter, it may well be that the physician prescribing the lethal 
medication for PAS is not so differently situated from either the 
pharmacist or the gun merchant. Determining the strength of a 
causal connection for legal purposes is a matter for both  
 
 214 But see Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 Hastings Center Rep 10, 
10 (Mar–Apr 1992) (“If there is no significant, intrinsic moral difference between the 
two, it is also difficult to see why public or legal policy should permit one but not the  
other; worries about abuse or about giving anyone dominion over the lives of others ap-
ply equally to either.”).  
 215 See Timothy E. Quill and Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and  
Patient Autonomy: Finding a Balance between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 
Annals Internal Med 763, 765 (1996) (advocating “enhanced autonomy,” a decisionmaking 
model in which physicians share their expertise and patients and physicians deliberate 
together about the best course of treatment). 
 216 This alignment explains why physicians and terminally ill patients together 
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Washington’s and New York’s statutes 
prohibiting PAS. See generally Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (challenging Washington’s statute); 
Quill, 521 US 793 (challenging New York’s statute). 
 217 See Engber, How Does Assisted Suicide Work? (cited in note 212) (describing the 
process for having physicians authorize PAS). 
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normative and metaphysical judgment.218 But the physician has 
reason to feel implicated over and above the extent of her causal 
role—again, as part of the team that decided on the course of 
treatment, the doctor is aligned with the patient’s ends in a way 
that the pharmacist is not. The physician is a participant in the 
patient’s care whereas the pharmacist is a detached facilitator of 
it. For that reason, the physician has reason to feel more impli-
cated in PAS than the pharmacist does. 
Now compare the pharmacist to the pharmacy clerk who 
hands the vial to the patient, or the cashier who rings up the pa-
tient. Assume that all three employees know the contents of the 
vial. On the basis of the features typically salient to us, the 
pharmacist is more directly involved than the other two—the 
pharmacist acts with greater specificity toward the patient’s 
end. The clerk and cashier can proceed mindlessly, but the 
pharmacist must focus her attention on providing the patient 
with the drugs that will arm him with the means to take his life. 
And the pharmacist may feel more implicated in light of her pro-
fessional training, too: “Today I used my expertise to give some-
one drugs that he will use to kill himself” is a plausible thought 
for her to have. For these reasons, it would be understandable if 
she were to see herself as more bound up in the patient’s suicide 
than either the clerk or cashier would. But the fact that her own 
role would seem more salient to her than the clerk’s or cashier’s 
roles would seem to either of them does not mean that the 
pharmacist is in fact more complicit than these other two drug-
store employees. From a disinterested standpoint, the pharma-
cist is just doing her job, just as the clerk and cashier are doing 
their jobs.219 The fact that the pharmacist cannot ignore her  
 
 218 See Moore, Causation and Responsibility at 278–79 (cited in note 72) (contending 
that the law’s conception of causation is stylized and based largely on the ends that the 
law seeks to serve rather than on any genuine metaphysical truths). 
 219 There is a well-known case in European criminal law theory involving a waiter 
who serves a dish that she knows to be poisonous to a customer without alerting the cus-
tomer to the lethal danger he now faces. See Luis E. Chiesa, The Evil Waiter Case, 69 U 
Miami L Rev 161, 162–63 (2014). The waiter is not responsible for the presence of the 
poison, and, according to European systems, she will not be held responsible for the cus-
tomer’s death notwithstanding her failure to warn. The waiter’s job was to deliver the 
dish, and she is relieved of responsibility for the death because she did what her job 
commanded. Many of us would find the European stance overly permissive—surely the 
waiter bears some responsibility for the death, and the law ought to track that responsi-
bility. But the pharmacist’s case is distinguishable, at any rate, because the patient knows 
(and indeed intends) that the drugs she is giving the patient will cause his demise.  
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contribution as readily as the clerk or cashier can does not make 
her more responsible; it just makes her feel more responsible. 
Drilling down on these scenarios and the roles that various 
individuals play in them reveals the following insight: many as-
sertions of complicity appear far more compelling from a first 
person, rather than third person, perspective. This is unsurpris-
ing given the relationship between conscience and identity.220 I 
have more reason to care about some state of affairs when it is I 
who has brought it about. And proximity can function as a proxy 
for other considerations that are relevant, too. For example, the 
person who purposely contributes to A will often want to ensure 
A’s successful completion, and so may involve himself more. It is 
not, then, his proximity that does the work of rendering him 
more responsible, but instead his greater commitment or sense 
of purpose. 
It is good that we feel more implicated in acts in which we 
have played a greater causal role. We have more power to en-
sure that these acts do not happen or that they happen in a bet-
ter way than they might have otherwise, and feeling more impli-
cated may well provide us with greater motivation to prevent 
these acts or to modify them for the better. But the point here is 
that this stronger feeling of implication need not reflect, and in-
deed may well exceed, the genuine extent of one’s complicity.221 
In other words, one might feel more morally responsible for con-
duct to which one bears a closer causal connection even though 
it would be unreasonable for anyone else to judge one more mor-
ally responsible solely on that basis. 
On the other hand, it is also generally good if we feel impli-
cated in acts to which our connections are remote. A person who 
places a premium on his moral purity will feel responsible for 
his contributions to wrongs or harms that most of us ignore. As 
such, he will constrain his conduct at the expense of freedoms 
that the rest of us claim as our right, restricting his purchases, 
carbon footprint, food choices, practices at work, relationships 
with others, and so forth, in the service of dissociating himself 
from conduct that he deems wrongful. The effect is, in general, 
to lessen harm in the world. To be sure, the tendency that he 
exhibits is not always morally desirable—extreme versions of 
this posture can reflect narcissism or neuroticism or moral  
 
 220 See notes 200–04 and accompanying text. 
 221 See Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 376–77 (cited in note 35). 
03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:32 PM 
2015] Conscience and Complicity 1957 
 
fetishism. But, in general, holding oneself to an unusually high 
moral standard is rightly taken to be a mark of virtue, not psy-
chological pathology. 
All of this suggests that the factors that determine the 
magnitude of an individual’s responsibility when judged by an 
impartial observer need not coincide with those that are salient 
from a first person perspective. Thus, a person’s sense of his own 
complicity may be greater or less than we would judge it to be.222 
More specifically, his own sense may depend on factors that are, 
again, from an impartial perspective, morally irrelevant but—
from the perspective of the person making the contributions—
not so readily dismissed. If his contribution claims more of his 
attention or strikes more acutely at his sense of self, he will feel 
himself to be more responsible than we, impartial observers, 
would judge him to be. Sometimes, we should respond to this di-
vergence by seeking to bring him around to our way of seeing 
the matter. But sometimes we should not: as I have said, his 
heightened moral sensitivity is sometimes salutary and often-
times laudable for its own sake. And, in any event, because his 
assessment is connected to his self-conception, we should be 
wary of trying to dissuade him, on the worry that doing so will 
interfere with his sense of self. For example, the pharmacist’s 
sense of what it is to be a pharmacist, or her conception of the 
kind of pharmacist she wants to be, might include a prohibition 
on using her skills to dispense medications that aim to end  
human life. Even if we would not judge her responsible in any 
measure were she to fill a prescription for PAS, she might think 
 
 222 In the text that follows, I contemplate the way that we should treat first person 
assessments of responsibility only when the person judges himself more harshly than an 
impartial observer would. The case in which someone judges himself less harshly can 
give rise to two points of divergence in practice: First, this more lax judge may decide 
that he is not sufficiently implicated in the conduct that he deems wrong to seek an ex-
emption. As such, questions whether to grant him conscientious objector status do not 
arise. Second, this more lax judge may recognize that he bears no more responsibility 
than we would ascribe to him, but he might nonetheless think that even the (relatively 
little) responsibility he bears is more than his personal morality can handle. Thus, he 
might seek an exemption even though he would think the magnitude of his responsibility 
less than we would think it. I do not see that there is any difference between this case 
and the one in which the objector judges himself to be more responsible because he 
thinks that he is meaningfully connected to some harm, even though we think that his 
contribution is negligible. At the end of the day, both objectors find their connections to 
the wrong intolerable—one because he sees his causal role as greater than we see it, and 
the other because he sees the magnitude of his causal role accurately but positions the 
threshold for complicity lower on the spectrum than we do. In both cases, then, deference 
is in order for the reasons that I adduce in the text above.  
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her own contribution abominable. And her thought here is not 
wrong, even if it is different from our own. In matters of profes-
sional or personal identity, individuals should be given some lat-
itude to forge meaning and set boundaries for themselves (at 
least when those boundaries are stricter than those that profes-
sional, moral, or legal norms require). 
The very same factors that favor conscientious objection in 
cases of direct participation (as in the draft) also favor deference 
when it comes to a person’s heightened sense of his own complic-
ity: Being made to contribute to conduct that one opposes is 
painful because it entails a dislocation from the self. So too being 
told that one has overly grand ideas about his professional iden-
tity or his personal agency can be painful, because these ideas 
constitute one’s sense of self in important ways. Given the pain of 
betraying one’s sense of self, then, we should treat first person as-
sessments of complicity with solicitude—at least presumptively. 
That is, all else equal, we should deem a complicity claim compel-
ling if the objector deems it so, and independent of the kind of 
contribution to the asserted wrong that it entails. Whether facil-
itation through insurance subsidization is morally troubling 
enough to count as complicity should then turn on only whether 
the objector believes that it is. 
D. Morally Mandated Indifference to Proximity 
This leaves us with a problem: On an account that grounds 
a conscientious exemption in the objector’s interest in not having 
his agency implicated in what he perceives as a wrong, there is 
no reason not to take the objector’s concerns at face value. It is 
his sense of meaning that is at stake and so we should defer to 
his understanding of the circumstances that make him complicit. 
Who are we to say that he is being overly sensitive or stringent 
when it comes to his own moral purity? On this way of proceed-
ing, we are without the resources to distinguish among asser-
tions of complicity on the basis of their strength. In particular, if 
we must accept assertions of complicity at face value, then we 
may not accord them more or less weight on the ground that 
complicity itself is, in Anglo-American law, a scalar concept whose 
magnitude turns at least in part on the actor’s causal proximity to 
the act in which he is (or takes himself to be) morally implicated. 
And yet as a practical matter, we cannot defer to every sin-
cere claim of complicity and exempt the person who would see 
himself as complicit from the conduct to which he objects in every 
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instance in which a complicity claim is raised. Two considera-
tions, which I explore in the next Part, provide counterweights 
against a claim of complicity. First, we must consider whether 
the grant of an exemption would impose costs on third parties 
and, if so, the magnitude of these costs. Second, we must bring 
to bear the insights culled from the three kinds of deference we 
discussed earlier and use them to evaluate how compelling dif-
ferent claims of complicity are. 
IV.  MISSING THIRD PARTIES: A TROUBLING OVERSIGHT 
In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg rails against 
the majority’s position in significant part because, according to 
her, the Court impermissibly overlooks the costs of an accommo-
dation to third parties223—there, the “thousands of women em-
ployed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons 
those corporations employ.”224 Ginsburg cited a handful of cases 
for the proposition that “[a]ccommodations to religious beliefs or 
observances . . . must not significantly impinge on the interests 
of third parties.”225 As I argue in Part IV.A, however, these cases 
contemplate third-party interests only tangentially, if at all. 
Nor, as I argue in Part IV.B, can one find support for that propo-
sition elsewhere in the doctrine. The law’s failure to adequately 
consider third-party costs is deeply troubling for two reasons. 
First, third-party effects are an ineluctable feature of complicity 
claims, for complicity arises only in light of one’s contribution to 
someone else’s conduct;226 to refrain from contributing will then 
 
 223 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“In the Court’s view, 
RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter 
the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corpora-
tion owners’ religious faith.”). Kara Loewentheil disfavors the term “third party” in this 
context, as she worries that casting the individuals whom an exemption affects as “third 
parties” implies that they are somehow incidental to the inquiry about whether to grant 
an exemption; rather, they deserve to be at its core. Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 47 
(cited in note 41). I am sympathetic to the strength of her concern for the rights and in-
terests of these individuals, but I do not agree that, as a matter of logic and procedure, 
we need to consider third parties right from the outset. Instead, the inquiry that I pro-
pose begins with the religious adherent, who must first establish that he has a claim 
worthy of deference before we even need consider third-party effects. As such, there is a 
way in which third-party interests are not at the core of the inquiry, and so I do not see 
the need to shift terminology. For all that, however, I do not mean to suggest that third 
parties’ interests are less important than Loewentheil’s account would have it. 
 224 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 225 Id at 2790 (Ginsburg dissenting).  
 226 See NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2566 (cited in note 28) (“Complicity-
based conscience claims assert a relationship to third parties whose conduct the claimants 
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leave the third party without a contribution that she may have 
been expecting (and, in the contraceptive-mandate cases, be-
lieves is her statutory right). Second, if I am right that (sincere 
and apolitical227) complicity claims warrant great deference on 
the merits, as I argued above, then it becomes all the more im-
portant to examine the extrinsic effects of an accommodation 
and, in particular, to consider whether it will impose undue 
costs on third parties. Part IV.C paves the way for such an ex-
amination by describing a balancing test through which courts 
can weigh the amount of deference that a complicity claim war-
rants against the magnitude of the burdens, if any, an accom-
modation would impose on third parties. Part IV.D applies this 
balancing test to Hobby Lobby and its possible progeny. 
I note at the outset that a good number of scholars believe 
that the doctrine, as it stands, already contemplates third-party 
interests.228 I think that the doctrinal bases for their under-
standing are perilously thin, for the reasons I articulate below. 
The idea is not that there is no plausible interpretation of case 
law that supports their position; it is that their interpretation 
does not rest on binding precedent, and it would be all too easy 
for the Court to eschew it. To the extent that one can distill a 
line of argument that seems to protect third-party interests, 
then, that line might be evanescent. Moreover, even if these 
scholars are right that the doctrine does currently contemplate 
third parties, we would still have reason to be concerned, for the 
doctrine says little—too little—about the way in which third-
party interests figure in, as well as about how much they figure 
 
view as sinful. In this sense, the third-party effects of accommodation are bound up in 
the form of the claim itself.”). 
 227 See text accompanying notes 99–104 (stressing that complicity claims must be 
sincere and deeply felt). 
 228 For a strong statement of this position, see Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off 
the Wall (cited in note 43) (“[I]n an important line of cases that has not received the at-
tention it deserves, the Supreme Court has insisted that the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits religious accommodations that impose burdens on third parties.”). See also  
Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 349 (cited in note 43) (“[B]y shifting 
the material costs of accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who 
hold them to their employees who do not, RFRA exemptions from the Mandate violate an 
Establishment Clause constraint on permissive accommodation.”). But see Loewentheil, 
62 Drake L Rev at 438 (cited in note 41) (“Our religious accommodation jurisprudence 
has no principled or systematic framework for taking the interests of third parties af-
fected by religious accommodations into account.”). It is notable that health-care-refusal 
laws, which allow medical providers to refuse to participate or assist in procedures that 
they oppose on religious grounds, also fail to address third-party harms. See NeJaime 
and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2542 (cited in note 28). 
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in.229 Thus, as I argue here, it is possible that doctrine requires 
courts to do no more than acknowledge that an accommodation 
will impose a burden on third parties (assuming arguendo that 
courts must heed third parties at all). More to the point, nothing 
in the doctrine, even on an interpretation that is most congenial 
to third-party interests, explicitly requires courts to deny  
accommodations that would impose costs on third parties, or 
even to weigh third-party interests against those of the religious 
objectors in an effort to determine whether to grant an accom-
modation.230 In short, as this Part aims to show, there is no 
plausible reading of doctrine according to which it adequately 
protects third parties.231 
A. The Hobby Lobby Dissent’s Strained Efforts to Find Third-
Party Considerations in the Doctrine 
Ginsburg was right to note that the Court should have con-
sidered the costs of an accommodation on third parties, but she 
was wrong to think that the Court betrayed the RFRA doctrine 
in neglecting to do so. While she cited four cases for her conten-
tion that the doctrine requires courts to factor in third-party 
costs,232 I now argue that these cases do not provide the requisite 
support. 
In rejecting religious adherents’ requests for accommoda-
tions, two of these cases do make reference to the interests of 
third parties, but only in an extremely tangential way. In  
Wisconsin v Yoder,233 the first case that Ginsburg cited, the 
 
 229 See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 474 (cited in note 41) (“[W]e can see that the 
pre-Smith constitutional framework—now applicable through the RFRA—is not com-
pletely insensitive to [concerns for third parties]. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the 
legal standards do not have a consistent way of taking account of these impacts.”). 
 230 See Part IV.B. 
 231 See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 438 (cited in note 41): 
Courts and scholars have occasionally noticed that such conflicts may exist, 
and with the advent of lawsuits regarding the contraceptive coverage require-
ment, they have been forced to confront them more directly. But neither has 
suggested any systematic way of thinking about or resolving them that trans-
cends the ill-fitting constraints of the current doctrine while remaining within 
the context of free exercise law. 
(citations omitted). 
 232 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2790 & n 8 (Ginsburg dissenting), citing Wisconsin v 
Yoder, 406 US 205, 230 (1972), Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc, 472 US 703 (1985),  
Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 720 (2005), and Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc v 
Superior Court, 85 P3d 67, 93 (Cal 2004). 
 233 406 US 205 (1972). 
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Court faced a religious challenge to a law requiring students to 
attend school through the age of sixteen. The challengers were 
Amish parents with high school–aged children who maintained 
that their faith prohibited sending their children to secular 
school past the eighth grade, both for fear of the corrupting in-
fluence of a secular education and to preserve the youths’ time to 
assume the farming obligations that they incurred in later ado-
lescence.234 In upholding the Amish parents’ religious objections, 
the Court was careful to note that religion would not always 
function as a trump. It thus referenced cases in which religious 
beliefs have been made to yield to secular laws because the reli-
gious conduct sought to be protected posed a “substantial threat 
to public safety, peace or order.”235 The Court then noted that the 
conduct at issue in Yoder posed no such threat and so those  
cases did not determine the outcome for the case at hand.236 
There is, to be sure, a sense in which threats to public safe-
ty, peace, and order affect third parties. But the Court can weigh 
these threats in its determination to grant an exemption with-
out referencing third parties at all. The government’s interest in 
maintaining public safety, peace, and order suffices. And indeed, 
that is the most plausible way to read the other related case that 
Ginsburg cited, Cutter v Wilkinson.237 There, facing inmates’ re-
quests for religious accommodations under the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000238 (RLUIPA), the 
Court recognized the Bureau of Prisons’ “need to maintain order 
and safety”239 (although, again, the Court concluded that safety 
could be maintained consistent with the accommodations). But 
order and safety are concerns of the government, not concerns of 
third parties—that is, other inmates—who might be harmed if 
hell were to break loose. The Court expressed as much when it 
noted, in the context of discussing relevant prior decisions, that 
“[c]ourts [ ] may be expected to recognize the government’s [ ] 
compelling interest in not facilitating inflammatory racist activi-
ty that could imperil prison security and order.”240 Describing 
 
 234 Id at 209–13. 
 235 Id at 230, quoting Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 402 (1963). 
 236 Yoder, 406 US at 230. 
 237 544 US 709 (2005). 
 238 Pub L No 106-274, 114 Stat 803, codified at 42 USC § 2000cc et seq. RLUIPA ef-
fectively extends RFRA to those “residing in or confined to” a government-run institu-
tion. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a). 
 239 Cutter, 544 US at 722. 
 240 Id at 723 n 11 (emphasis added). 
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the relevant interests as the government’s makes clear that the 
Court was concerned not with protecting the targets of racism 
but instead with providing for a safe and orderly prison.241 
The next case that Ginsburg cited involved an Establishment 
Clause claim. Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc242 addressed a 
Connecticut statute that required businesses to grant Sabbath 
leave to any employee who requested it on religious grounds, no 
matter the day that the Sabbath was observed.243 The Court did 
refer to third parties there, but not to claim that they have in-
terests that the Court must consider in their own right. Instead, 
the Court did so to establish that an exemption would violate 
the Establishment Clause by privileging one set of interests (for 
example, those of religious employees who observe a Saturday 
Sabbath) over another (for example, those of employees who do 
not observe Sabbath but who might nonetheless have good  
reasons to want Saturday as their day off). Thus, the Court re-
viewed all of the ways in which the statute’s “absolute” require-
ment—its “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observ-
ers”—elevated the interests of religious employees over 
nonreligious ones, and it therefore concluded that “the statute 
[went] beyond having an incidental or remote effect of advancing 
religion. The statute ha[d] a primary effect that impermissibly 
advance[d] a particular religious practice.”244 We can see, then, 
that third-party interests did not function in that case as they 
would need to in order to conclude that they are what mattered 
in the Court’s determination. The Court referenced the effects on 
third parties as a premise in an argument whose conclusion was 
that the law violated the Establishment Clause. If the Court 
cared about third-party interests for their own sake, it would 
have been enough that the law imposed burdens on third parties 
by making it harder for them to have their preferred days off. 
There would have been no need for the Court to justify its refusal 
 
 241 The same can be said for other cases in which the Court denies religious entities 
special treatment on grounds that superficially suggest an interest in protecting racial 
minorities from animus but, on closer examination, speak to the government’s or the  
public’s interest in living in a society free of racism, and not to the particular interests 
that members of the targeted minorities might have in not suffering from that discrimi-
nation. See, for example, Bob Jones, 461 US at 604 (defending the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice’s decision to withdraw tax-exempt status from a university that prohibited interra-
cial dating or marriage on the ground that “the Government has a fundamental, 
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education”) (emphasis added).  
 242 472 US 703 (1985). 
 243 Id at 705–06. 
 244 Id at 710 (citations omitted). 
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to grant the exemption based on a concern about the evils of 
government support of religion in their own right.245 
Ginsburg’s final case was a California Supreme Court deci-
sion involving a nonprofit seeking an exemption from a contra-
ceptive mandate contained in California’s health-care law.246 
This case has the most direct, seemingly supportive statement of 
Ginsburg’s position. There, the court stated: “We are unaware of 
any decision in which this court, or the United States Supreme 
Court, has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a 
neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that 
the requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of 
third parties,”247 and it cited Yoder and United States v Lee248 as 
evidence.249 But Yoder, we have seen, did not involve third-party 
rights.250 And Lee, a case rejecting an Amish employer’s plea for 
 
 245 Similar considerations allow us to dispose of the suggestion that Trans World 
Airlines, Inc v Hardison, 432 US 63 (1977) (“TWA”), turned on third-party interests, as 
some commentators have suggested. See, for example, Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1464 
n 183 (cited in note 18). In TWA, the Court addressed a religious adherent’s claim that 
TWA violated his rights to religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 by failing to give him a day off on the day of his Sabbath. TWA, 432 US at 
67–70. In response, the Court noted that it would be costly to TWA to grant the request-
ed day off, and it held that “to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs 
are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want would involve unequal 
treatment of employees on the basis of their religion.” Id at 84. Title VII could not sup-
port this kind of discrimination and so the Court denied the accommodation. Id. Here, as 
in Thornton, the Court invoked third parties, but it did not do so because third-party  
interests were themselves at issue. Instead, and again as in Thornton, the treatment of 
third parties was relevant only as an evidentiary matter—that treatment demonstrated 
that the religious adherent was indeed seeking a privilege that the company did not be-
stow on others. Id at 92. Acceding to the religious adherent’s request, then, would have 
the Court favor religion impermissibly; it is this favoring, not the effect on third parties, 
that sustains the Court’s decision. 
 246 See Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 74–76. 
 247 Id at 93. 
 248 455 US 252 (1982). 
 249 Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93. 
 250 See text accompanying notes 233–36. The California Supreme Court also ap-
pears to have read Yoder incorrectly. It stated that, in Yoder, in evaluating whether to 
grant an “exemption from a general law requiring [ ] older children to attend public 
school, the [United States Supreme C]ourt emphasized that its conclusion depended on 
the assumption that no Amish child wished to attend.” Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93 
(emphasis added). But the United States Supreme Court said exactly the opposite: 
“[O]ur holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the 
child as contrasted with that of the parents.” Yoder, 406 US at 230 (emphasis added). 
And Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Court, went on to say that “it is [the par-
ents’] right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin’s 
power to impose criminal penalties on the parent.” Id at 230–31. In this way, the Court 
considered only the parents’ interests, and not the interests of their children, who were 
third parties to the litigation. The discrepancy between the California Supreme Court’s 
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an exemption from social security taxes, does not turn on the in-
terests of third parties either.251 Instead, Lee turns on the ad-
verse consequences to the system as a whole if courts were to 
begin granting exemptions to tax burdens on an ad hoc basis.252 
And the more general review of the case law undertaken here 
demonstrates that it is entirely reasonable that the California 
Supreme Court would not have been aware of United States  
Supreme Court cases in which the Court squarely recognized 
third-party costs and yet granted the exemption anyway.253 
 
reading of Yoder and the text of Yoder itself casts doubt on the former’s ability to proceed 
as a faithful reader of constitutional doctrine. 
 251 See generally Lee, 455 US 252. The Court did say in passing that “[g]ranting an 
exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s 
religious faith on the employees.” Id at 261. But this is dictum. The Court’s reason for 
refusing the exemption is, as I argue in the text following this note, a concern about the 
workability of the social security system as a whole, not a concern about depriving the 
business’s non-Amish workers of social security benefits. See id at 263 (Stevens concur-
ring) (“I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the difficulties associated with processing 
other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds justify a rejection of this claim.”). 
 252 See id at 260: 
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge 
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates 
their religious belief. . . . Because the broad public interest in maintaining a 
sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the 
payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.  
 This argument appears to be in tension with a provision that already existed at the 
time of Lee, which the petitioner in Lee cited—namely, an exemption for self-employed 
individuals whose religion opposed social security benefits and whose sect provided care 
for their own elderly. See 26 USC § 1402(g). One might then think that the problem in 
Lee went not to a concern for the tax system as a whole but instead to a concern for third 
parties: Lee threatened to deny non-Amish employees social security benefits, whereas 
the existing exemption for self-employed individuals concerned only the Amish person 
himself. Indeed, Ginsburg, in her Hobby Lobby dissent, stated that “the Court recognized 
in Lee that allowing a religion-based exemption to a commercial employer would  
‘operat[e] to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.’” Hobby Lobby, 134 
S Ct at 2804 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Lee, 455 US at 261. See also Bob Egelko, 
Supreme Court Unmoved by Religious Employer’s Coverage Objections — for the Amish 
(SFGate, Aug 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TB4X-NLLH (quoting Professor  
Micah Schwartzman, who “contrasted the court’s concern for the Amish farmer’s workers 
[in Lee] in 1982 with its brush-off of Hobby Lobby’s employees”). 
 The language from Lee referencing the burdens that third parties might incur ap-
pears in the very last paragraph of the decision and likely constitutes mere rhetorical 
flourish rather than a premise necessary to the holding. See Lee, 455 US at 261. At any 
rate, the quotation from Lee merely states the fact that granting the employer an exemp-
tion would impose costs on those of his employees who do not share his faith. It does not 
say that the exemption would therefore be unconstitutional, or even that courts would 
have to weigh these costs against the employer’s rights of religious freedom. As such, the 
quoted language leaves the question of how third-party costs matter—and in particular 
whether they would affect the outcome at all—totally unclear.  
 253 See Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93. 
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These cases do not exist, because the Court never squarely fac-
tors third-party costs into its determinations about whether to 
grant religious exemptions in the first place.254 
B. The Troubling Omission of Third-Party Costs 
One might think that current doctrine already allows for the 
consideration of third-party interests, even if their interests 
have been given short shrift in practice. Here I address three 
doctrines that appear, at least superficially, to address third-
party interests, and I argue that none is ultimately up to the 
task. 
 
 254 The California Supreme Court cited two other cases in passing for the proposi-
tion that courts will not grant religious exemptions when the exemptions would adverse-
ly affect third parties. In the first case, Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of 
Labor, 471 US 290 (1985), the United States Supreme Court rejected a plea for an ex-
emption from the minimum wage and reporting requirements of the Fair Labor  
Standards Act (FLSA). Id at 304–05. The relevant provisions of the FLSA were 29 USC 
§§ 206(b), 207(a), 211(c), 215(a)(2), and 215(a)(5). The Court rejected the plea because it 
found that the FLSA imposed no burden whatsoever on the objectors. Tony and Susan 
Alamo Foundation, 471 US at 303–06. As such, the Court did not need to undertake an 
inquiry into the interests that the legal requirements were intended to serve, and it did 
not undertake that inquiry. In the second case, also involving an as-applied challenge to 
the FLSA, the Fourth Circuit also found that the burden on religion, if any, was “limited.” 
Dole v Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F2d 1389, 1397–98 (4th Cir 1990). It nonetheless 
went on to assess the interest intended to be served by the FLSA, which it identified as 
an interest in protecting women from employment discrimination by ensuring equal pay 
for both sexes. Id at 1398. This looks to be an interest in protecting third parties, but it is 
an interest that “counts” only because it is the asserted interest of the government in 
imposing the FLSA in the first place. Id. In this way, the interest in women’s equality is 
like the interest of the Cutter inmates in security—they are interests that receive judi-
cial notice only because the government has chosen to adopt these interests as its own. I 
elaborate on the distinction between addressing third-party interests squarely versus 
tangentially in the text following this note. In any event, the court in Shenandoah  
Baptist Church upheld the FLSA requirements not so much because of anyone’s inter-
ests in equal pay as because of reasons similar to those underpinning Lee—namely, in-
terests in maintaining Congress’s objectives by ensuring the universal application of the 
law. As the court said:  
There is no principled way of exempting the school without exempting all other 
sectarian schools and thereby the thousands of lay teachers and staff members 
on their payrolls. This would undermine the congressional goal of making min-
imum wage and equal pay requirements applicable to private as well as public 
schools.  
Id. Only a very strained reading of the case, then, would allow one to infer that it sought 
to protect the interests of those whom an exemption would directly affect. 
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1. The compelling-interest prong of RFRA. 
In defending a legal requirement against a claim that the 
requirement substantially burdens an objector’s exercise of reli-
gion, the government is asked to adduce the compelling interest 
that the challenged requirement is designed to serve.255 Some-
times, the government’s interest coincides with that of third par-
ties. Yet there is no reason to think that this will always be true, 
and when the two diverge, the government need not press both 
its own interest as well as the third parties’ interest.256 Thus, for 
example, consider a religious adherent who objects to a military 
draft because he believes homosexuality is evil and, in the wake 
of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,257 he would find 
it too offensive to his values to serve alongside individuals who 
are openly gay. The legal requirement he challenges—that is, 
his conscription—is motivated by concerns for national security. 
These may be compelling enough in their own right to deny the 
objector an exemption, but even if they are, they do not at all 
track what is at stake for the gays and lesbians whom this objec-
tor’s claim denigrates. The government’s compelling interest, 
then, might not include the interests of third parties. Accordingly, 
a test that does not look to third-party costs over and above the 
government’s interest is likely to leave third parties out in the 
cold. 
2. The Establishment Clause. 
Some commentators look to the Establishment Clause to 
protect third parties from a religious exemption that would  
otherwise burden them. Thus, for example, Professor Frederick 
Gedicks and his coauthor Rebecca Van Tassell contend that “the 
Court condemns permissive accommodations on Establishment 
Clause grounds when the accommodations impose significant 
burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate in the 
 
 255 See 42 USC § 2000bb-1. 
 256 Justice Kennedy, in his Hobby Lobby concurrence, seems to recognize that third-
party interests count when, but only when, they are the interests that the government 
sought to advance through the legal requirement in question. According to him, religious 
exercise may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their 
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 
(Kennedy concurring). Not all interests warrant protection, then—only those that “the 
law deems compelling.” Id (Kennedy concurring). 
 257 Pub L No 111-321, 124 Stat 3515. 
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accommodated practice.”258 Even assuming that their contention 
is correct,259 it does not fully capture the concern here—that the 
 
 258 Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 349 (cited in note 43). See 
also Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 54 (cited in note 41) (arguing 
that an exemption from the contraceptive mandate violates the Establishment Clause, 
which “prohibit[s] RFRA’s application when . . . a particular exemption would shift the 
costs of the accommodated religious practice to identifiable and discrete third parties”); 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2802 n 25 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 259 I have my doubts, though I will restrict myself here to taking issue with just one 
strand of argument that those with a more capacious understanding of the Establishment 
Clause have marshaled. Some theorists point out that Thornton, discussed above, favora-
bly quotes Judge Learned Hand’s contention that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no 
one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their 
conduct to his own religious necessities.” Thornton, 472 US at 710, quoting Otten v  
Baltimore & O. R. Co, 205 F2d 58, 61 (2d Cir 1953). These theorists read in this state-
ment the Court’s recognition that the government may not protect religion when doing so 
would impinge on others’ rights. See, for example, Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off 
the Wall (cited in note 43); Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 358 (cited 
in note 43). See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2791 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Zech-
ariah Chafee Jr, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv L Rev 932, 957 (1919) (“[W]ith 
respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right to swing your 
arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.’”) (quotation marks omitted).  
In response, it is worth looking at the Learned Hand quotation in the context in 
which Thornton invokes it. The full quotation from Thornton is as follows:  
This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests 
contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well articulat-
ed by Judge Learned Hand: 
“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit 
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own reli-
gious necessities.” 
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or remote effect of  
advancing religion. . . . The statute has a primary effect that impermissibly  
advances a particular religious practice. 
Thornton, 472 US at 710. The meaning of the Learned Hand quotation itself can be fur-
ther gleaned if it is read along with its surrounding language: “The First Amendment 
protects one against action by the government, though even then, not in all circumstanc-
es; but it gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others 
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.” Otten, 205 F2d at 61 (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted). The point there was that one cannot claim First 
Amendment protections against nonstate actors—there, union employees who pressured 
the employer (a private railway company) to discharge the plaintiff because the plaintiff 
refused to join the union. The issue in Otten, then, was whether the plaintiff could con-
vince a court to compel others to alter their conduct—in that case, by giving up the bar-
gaining power that the union members would enjoy only if that place of employment 
were a “union shop”—because union membership contravened the employee’s religious 
convictions. Id at 59–60. The plaintiff’s request, Learned Hand argued, was no different 
from that of a “man [who] might find it incompatible with his conscience to live in a city 
in which open saloons were licensed; yet he would have no constitutional right to insist 
that the saloons must be closed.” Id at 61. Learned Hand’s position then contemplates 
not cases in which someone seeks a religious accommodation and third parties are af-
fected incidentally; instead, it applies to cases in which controlling third parties’ conduct 
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doctrine does not adequately consider the burdens that third 
parties might incur in light of an exemption. For one thing, all of 
Hobby Lobby’s employees who do not share its religious views 
have reason to feel affronted by its religious exercise. The  
Establishment Clause concern is not restricted, then, to the 
women who will be denied contraception as a result of the ex-
emption. Second, there may be cases in which a religious exemp-
tion does not result in an Establishment Clause violation, and 
yet third parties do have genuine cause to feel that their inter-
ests have been sacrificed. Suppose that the Amish teens in 
Yoder, for example, had wanted to continue with their secular 
schooling because they found their interactions with secular 
peers enriching. Their interest in continued schooling—namely, 
exposure to diverse peers—would be different from the interests 
Wisconsin proffered in support of the law requiring schooling 
through age sixteen—namely, ensuring a reasonably educated 
electorate;260 the teens’ interests would not be rooted in a com-
plaint about the state’s undue support of religion. If the Court 
were then to grant the teens’ parents the requested exemption, 
the teens would have reason to feel aggrieved and their grievance 
 
is the precise and only purpose of the sought-after accommodation. This is a decisive  
distinction. 
Return now to the portion of Thornton in which the Learned Hand quotation ap-
pears. There, Burger cited two cases for the proposition that government action that only 
incidentally advances religion does not violate the Establishment Clause. In one of those 
cases, the Court upheld a Maryland statute providing grants to private colleges—both 
secular and religious—so long as the grants were used for nonsectarian purposes.  
Roemer v Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 US 736, 747 (1976). In the other, the 
Court upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, a New York statute authoriz-
ing the state to buy and then lend secular textbooks to high school students attending 
both public and private (including parochial) schools. Board of Education of Central 
School District No 1 v Allen, 392 US 236, 248–49 (1968). Again, the books themselves 
were not religious in nature, and the financial relief that they provided benefited the 
students’ parents, not the schools themselves. Id at 243–45. The contrast between 
Thornton and these two cases is relevant here, because it underscores that what mat-
tered to the Court in Thornton was government support for religion and not government 
accommodations that shift burdens to third parties. Put differently, the Connecticut law 
challenged in Thornton would have been found defective even if it prevented no secular 
employee from having his preferred day off. The defect lay in the formal favoring of reli-
gious interests and not in any setback to secular interests. It is for this reason that 
Burger ended his discussion with the conclusion that, unlike the Maryland and New 
York statutes, the Connecticut statute “has a primary effect that impermissibly advances 
a particular religious practice.” Thornton, 472 US at 710 (emphasis added). On the logic 
of that case, the government may not advance religion, full stop. Third-party effects are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the Court to find an Establishment Clause violation. 
 260 Wisconsin had argued that education was necessary for participation in demo-
cratic life and for cultivating self-sufficiency. Yoder, 406 US at 221. 
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would have nothing to do with an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.261 In this way, the Establishment Clause can protect the 
rights of third parties in only a subset of the cases in which their 
interests are threatened. 
3. The “shoals” causing claims for religious accommodation 
to founder. 
I argued above that Cutter weighed the burden of a legal  
requirement against the government’s interest in prison securi-
ty; it held that a religious accommodation would not in fact un-
dermine that interest, and so it granted the exemption. As such, 
the case cannot fairly be read as an example of the Court weigh-
ing a bid for religious accommodation against the interests of 
discrete third parties. With that said, it is worth noting that 
Cutter contains what is perhaps the most succinct statement to 
the effect that third-party harms matter. Listing the “shoals” on 
which prior bids for religious accommodation have “founder[ed],” 
the Court stated, “Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation 
may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”262 This is powerful language, 
all the more so because Justice Alito quotes it in a footnote in 
the Hobby Lobby majority opinion, in a discussion about wheth-
er courts may deny religious exemptions from programs aimed 
at providing benefits to third parties.263 One might then think 
 
 261 One who holds that the Establishment Clause prohibits religious accommoda-
tions that would harm third parties will object to my treatment of the hypothetical Yoder 
variant that I describe. The objection would proceed as follows: If the Amish teens want 
to continue their secular education, and a court affords their parents a religious exemp-
tion that prevents the teens from doing so, the teens will have reason to think that the 
court has impermissibly supported religion at their expense. In other words, the exemp-
tion would, contrary to my argument, violate the Establishment Clause. In response, it is 
worth noting that whether the Establishment Clause contemplates third-party costs in 
this way is precisely the issue. Reviewing the case law, I have sought to argue that we 
cannot accurately read Establishment Clause case law in this way. As such, the teens 
could not wield the Establishment Clause to contest the costs that they would incur from their 
parents’ religious exemption. See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 475 (cited in note 41):  
[T]he problem is not so much protecting third parties from being forced to par-
ticipate indirectly in someone else’s religious practices or suffer for them, but is 
rather—or additionally—that [third parties] sometimes have independently ex-
isting interests, both practical and expressive, which are subordinated to reli-
gious interests when accommodations are granted.  
 262 Cutter, 544 US at 720. 
 263 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37. 
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that the settled view of the Court is that third-party costs  
matter.264 
Yet even if the Court has adopted the view that it must 
“take adequate account” of third-party costs,265 this would hardly 
establish that the Court is committed to protecting third parties. 
The meaning and implications of the Cutter language are radi-
cally unclear. What will count as having taken “adequate ac-
count” of third-party interests? How much weight must these in-
terests be given for a court’s accounting to have been 
“adequate”? And what does giving them their due weight entail? 
Is it enough for a court merely to note that the exemption will 
impose burdens on third parties? Or does the statement mean 
that, when courts do recognize that third parties will be bur-
dened, they should seek to arrive at an alternative accommoda-
tion? Or should they deny the accommodation altogether? Cutter 
itself provides no answers to these questions, because the Court 
found that “nonbeneficiaries” would not be harmed by the re-
quested accommodation.266 The Hobby Lobby majority arrived at 
the same conclusion with respect to the third parties there, giv-
en the availability of alternative arrangements for providing 
contraception.267 
At any rate, the foregoing analysis of the relevant case law 
suggests that the claim that courts must take “adequate  
account” of the interests of “nonbeneficiaries” fails to find sup-
port in prior cases. It would be all too easy for a court to dismiss 
this part of Cutter on the ground that Cutter incorrectly inter-
preted its precedents and the case itself looked to the effects of 
an accommodation only on the government’s interests, not on 
the interests of third parties. Third parties should not have to 
rely on so precarious a statement of what the law requires. 
 
 264 I am grateful to Professors Koppelman and Schwartzman, each of whom urged 
this language upon me. 
 265 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37. 
 266 See Cutter, 544 US at 720. One might seek further support for the claim that 
third-party costs matter in their own right in the following Cutter language: “Should in-
mate requests for religious accommodations . . . impose unjustified burdens on other in-
stitutionalized persons . . . the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” Id at 726. 
But again, the language is unhelpfully vague because we are not told what counts as a 
burden, let alone an unjustified burden, and the Court did not have occasion to decide 
the matter in Cutter itself because it found no burden there. 
 267 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37. 
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4. Third-party intervention. 
Even if one agrees that neither RFRA nor the Establishment 
Clause straightforwardly contemplates third-party interests, one 
might think that the concern about overlooking third parties is 
mitigated by the possibility that they will seek to intervene in 
the case and bring their interests before the court in that way.268 
But it would be foolhardy to rely on this mechanism alone. For 
one thing, possibly affected third parties must seek a court’s 
permission to be heard, and the court has discretion to grant or 
deny the intervention.269 For another, while the contraceptive-
mandate cases received a lot of publicity—and so readily put 
third parties on notice that their rights were subject to abroga-
tion—many other cases seeking religious exemptions may not be 
so prominent. When they are not, third parties cannot be count-
ed on to know of their own accord that their interests are at 
stake. Finally, it is unfair for third parties to incur litigation 
costs to protect their interests when they are not impinging on 
the objectors’ rights of free exercise any more than anyone else is. 
* * * 
I argued above that a court should proceed with great defer-
ence when facing a claim for religious exemption. The court 
should, in particular, judge the claim on the merits only to the 
extent that the claim rests on suspect empirical facts. But if 
there are few intrinsic limits on claims of complicity, then there 
is an even greater need to attend to extrinsic concerns—
specifically, the effect an accommodation might have on third 
parties. Pluralism demands respect for religious differences, but 
that respect goes both ways: it entails that we must be open to 
many claims of conscience, but we must also ensure that these 
claims do not unduly or disproportionately interfere with the in-
terests of discrete third parties. I turn now to some concrete 
suggestions for operationalizing this careful balancing act. 
 
 268 See, for example, Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 558–59 (granting leave to intervene to 
three Notre Dame students who claimed an interest in the contraceptive coverage they 
would receive were Notre Dame not granted an exemption). 
 269 See FRCP 24(b). There are cases in which third parties are accorded intervention 
as of right. See FRCP 24(a). But it is not at all clear that the religious-exemption cases 
are of this kind. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit treated the Notre Dame students’ interven-
tion as one requiring the court’s permission. See Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 558 (“We need 
to say something about the three Notre Dame students whom we have allowed to  
intervene.”) (emphasis added).  
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C. Balancing Concerns for Complicity against Third-Party 
Costs 
We have seen that claims of complicity have moral, empiri-
cal, and relational dimensions, and that each of these may re-
quire a different level of deference. At the same time, whatever 
the level of deference accorded to a complicity claim, it must still 
be balanced against the burdens, if any, that an accommodation 
would impose on third parties. In this Section, I seek to put 
these two pieces together, first reviewing the kinds of claims 
that warrant deference on the merits and then bringing to bear 
the extrinsic consideration of third-party costs.270 
1. Assessing the strength of complicity claims. 
As I argued above in the discussion about the three kinds of 
deference,271 the government need not defer to complicity claims 
that are premised on mistakes of empirical fact. As such, the 
government may deny an exemption based on a claim of complic-
ity that turns on factual errors, even if an exemption would im-
pose no third-party costs. 
Matters are more complicated when it comes to complicity 
claims that turn on nonstandard moral or relational premises, 
however. Given that courts may not assess the cogency of an ob-
jector’s moral claims, the moral elements of a conscientious ob-
jection must be treated with absolute deference for the reasons 
stated above. Courts must then take at face value an objector’s 
claim that a certain act (for example, the use of contraception, 
receipt of a blood transfusion, and so forth) is wrong. With that 
said, courts are not without the resources to address hate-based 
claims—such as those declaring homosexuality evil—as I argued 
above.272 
It is more difficult to grant a categorical right of deference  
to relational claims, especially given the possibility that  
someone might claim a causal connection that is extravagantly 
 
 270 Schwartzman also advocates a balancing approach in cases in which, for exam-
ple, taxpayers are made to support government activities that their convictions oppose. 
But Schwartzman’s balancing approach remains faithful to the RFRA doctrine insofar as 
it restricts its focus to the interests of the objector, on the one hand, and the government, 
on the other. As with the RFRA test, then, Schwartzman’s test does not attend to the 
interests of third parties who might come to be burdened were the religious objector 
granted an accommodation. See Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 346–54 (cited in note 35). 
 271 See Part I.D. 
 272 See text accompanying note 118. 
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far-fetched.273 Nonetheless, deference should be the default here, 
given that concerns about complicity can strike at the heart of 
the believer’s conscience and given that, unlike with empirical 
claims, we lack nonneutral considerations with which to dispute 
the metaphysics underpinning the more expansive notions of 
complicity in conscientious objectors’ claims.274 Courts may 
abandon the default only when the claim is interwoven with 
empirical assertions that are themselves clearly mistaken. Thus, 
for example, consider an employer who seeks to exclude coverage 
for ultrasounds during pregnancy from his health insurance 
plan on the belief that ultrasounds are a sufficient cause of left-
handedness in the resulting child and that left-handedness is 
evil. It would be easy to defeat this claim on the factual merits 
(most women have ultrasounds during pregnancy and most chil-
dren are not left-handed). Less far-fetched metaphysical claims, 
at least when they entail more responsibility rather than less, 
must be treated with deference. 
2. Balancing deference against third-party interests. 
The fact that all moral and many relational claims must be 
treated with deference does not automatically entail an exemp-
tion; it merely shifts the burden of the inquiry. The government 
then needs to defend the challenged legal requirement, as RFRA 
requires. But a separate, additional set of considerations must 
be brought to bear—namely, considerations tracking the inter-
ests of third parties.275 
 
 273 See note 155 and accompanying text. 
 274 See Rawls, Political Liberalism at 144–50 (cited in note 115) (describing an over-
lapping consensus and maintaining that we can reach decisions on the basic political 
structure of society—notwithstanding differences in individuals’ metaphysical commit-
ments—so long as these different commitments nonetheless support the same policy  
outcomes). 
 275 Professor Eric Orts has argued that it is tendentious to speak of third parties’ 
interests rather than their rights—for example, rights to contraceptive coverage under 
the ACA. See Eric Orts, Undertheorizing the Corporation Continued: Hobby Lobby and 
Employees’ Rights (The Conglomerate, July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4GW 
P-24BE. He compellingly contends that framing the conflict as one between religious 
rights and third-party interests already tips the balance in favor of the employers, be-
cause rights trump interests. As a general matter, I agree, but I nonetheless describe 
what is at stake for third parties in terms of their interests, rather than their rights, be-
cause I mean for the test that I describe to apply to all complicity claims, and some of 
these threaten to impose costs on third parties even when they do not threaten to in-
fringe any third parties’ rights. I am also not convinced that referring to the employees’ 
“rights” under the ACA is any less tendentious. The rights employees have are not nec-
essarily rights against their employers: It was the HHS rules, rather than the statute 
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Deference is a binary term in this context—a claim of com-
plicity either does or does not get deference. There is no middle 
ground when it comes to moral or relational claims because 
there is no legitimate scale according to which one could meas-
ure the magnitude of the claim’s plausibility. Instead, plausibil-
ity weightings are off the table. 
Third-party costs, by contrast, are scalar. The greater the 
cost to third parties of an exemption, the more weight third-
party interests should carry. The process of weighing something 
with an absolute value against something with a scalar value 
requires that we posit a threshold on the scalar side of the equa-
tion: costs exceeding some threshold amount should be found 
untenable and so exemptions should be denied when these ex-
cessive costs would otherwise result. 
Specifying the location of the threshold on a cost spectrum is 
a matter for democratic deliberation. There is no a priori,  
context-independent answer to the question of how much of a 
burden it is fair to impose on third parties for the sake of re-
specting religious observance.276 Several ancillary considerations 
 
itself, that mandated cost-free access to contraception. And even if the government chose 
to grant women these rights, it did not need to impose the corresponding duty on their 
employers. 
 276 Loewentheil contends that equality-implicating third-party costs should defeat a 
bid for an exemption so long as they are “substantial,” which she understands to mean 
neither “de minimis” nor “exceedingly rare.” Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 477 (cited 
in note 41). She arrives at this contention because she thinks equality-implicating rights 
are just as important as rights of religious freedom and that the latter ground claims for 
accommodation so long as the challenged legal requirement “substantially” burdens reli-
gious exercise. Id at 483 (“If the core of free exercise doctrine is the desire to protect reli-
gious exercise from discrimination that would render believers unequal to other citizens, 
its protections should only extend so far as they do not undermine the equality of nonbe-
lievers on the other side.”) (citation omitted).  
In contrast to Loewentheil, I have argued that the purpose of rights of conscience is 
not (or not merely) to prevent discrimination against those with deeply held convictions 
that conflict with the law but (also) to promote lives of integrity. On my way of thinking, 
living according to conscience is an important human good, one that the government 
should protect, all else equal. See Part III.B (describing the place of conscience in one’s 
sense of self and meaning and, as a result, the deep pain that attends violations of con-
science). See also Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality 11 
(Harvard 2013) (arguing that the First Amendment reasonably “treats religion as a dis-
tinctive human good” and concluding that it is therefore “not unfair” to give religion spe-
cial treatment); McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1517 (cited in note 32):  
To [those who saw in America a refuge for religious exercise], the freedom to 
follow religious dogma was one of this nation’s foremost blessings, and the will-
ingness of the nation to respect the claims of a higher authority than “those 
whose business it is to make laws” was one of the surest signs of its liberality.  
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warrant mention, however. First, the government should seek to 
minimize occasions for conflict between religious beliefs and 
third-party interests. (I note, for example, that a national 
health-care plan—whatever its other demerits—would have ob-
viated employers’ conscientious objections to the ACA.)277 The 
government did so when it excluded churches from the contra-
ceptive mandate at the outset. It might have foreseen objections 
to the contraceptive mandate from religious institutions and 
even from for-profit entities, and so provided universal access to 
contraception outside of the employer-subsidized insurance de-
livery system. Second, when third-party interests would be im-
plicated were an exemption granted, courts and the government 
must work to ensure that these interests are raised and ade-
quately defended. 
3. Bringing third-party interests before a court. 
This brings us to the final piece of doctrinal revision, which 
provides a means for third parties to have their interests repre-
sented in court. The government bears an obligation to assess 
whether a requested exemption would impose costs on third par-
ties. When the government determines that it would, the gov-
ernment must make a good faith effort to alert the relevant 
third parties to the proceedings. For example, the government 
might contact a representative advocacy group (for example, the 
National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, in 
the case of the contraceptive mandate), or take out ads in na-
tional news sources (paper and electronic). 
Further, the government—which is to say, taxpayers—
should fund the third parties’ legal representation. As a society, 
we should be willing to incur some costs in exchange for confer-
ring religious freedom. But those costs should be shared equally 
among us. We would impermissibly chill requests for religious 
exemptions were we to require the objectors to pay for third par-
ties’ legal representation. And requiring third parties to fully 
fund their efforts to protect themselves would expose them to a 
 
I thus view living conscientiously as deeply important, though just how important it is 
and how its importance should be weighed against other interests are matters that we 
citizens must together decide. Given the role I contemplate for democratic deliberation in 
this area, I resist Loewentheil’s a priori idea that rights of conscience are on par with 
equality-implicating interests. 
 277 I elaborate on this suggestion in a Washington Post op-ed. See Sepinwall, Can a 
Corporation Have a Conscience? (cited in note 29). 
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disproportionate burden, even if they were to prevail. According-
ly, the government should have to subsidize third parties’ legal 
costs, on behalf of us all.278 
Finally, it would not be sufficient to contact only the third 
parties most immediately affected by the case—for example, 
Hobby Lobby’s employees, given that the exemption affects the 
health-care coverage that they will enjoy. Hobby Lobby has 
precedential value for pending contraceptive challenges and for 
any other challenges that will be filed in its wake. Thus, it 
stands to affect the interests of many women of reproductive 
age, and it is for this reason that notice should extend beyond 
the Hobby Lobby employees themselves. And there is a separate 
reason to notify an advocacy organization, rather than the po-
tentially affected employees themselves: As Professors Micah 
Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe compellingly argued with re-
spect to Hobby Lobby, “employees are (understandably) reluc-
tant to come forward against their employers, even though their 
constitutional claim is strong and even though they have a lot to 
lose if the case goes the wrong way.”279 Their concerns would ob-
tain in any employer-mandate challenge. 
D. Assessing Hobby Lobby and Its Progeny in Light of the 
Proposed Balancing Test 
The proposed revisions to the doctrine articulated here 
would likely not have altered the outcome in Hobby Lobby. To be 
sure, women of childbearing age ought to have been entitled to 
express the nature and meaning of the consequences an accom-
modation would yield for them. But the Court should have ruled 
in favor of Hobby Lobby’s requested exemption even had it at-
tended to third-party costs. This is because an exemption for 
Hobby Lobby would not in fact have imposed any costs on third 
parties: the government had already established a work-around 
for the contraceptive mandate for religious nonprofits. With that 
alternative arrangement in place, the Court was in a position to 
offer Hobby Lobby an exemption at virtually no cost to Hobby 
Lobby’s employees or their dependents. As such, given the fact 
 
 278 For that matter, we might decide that parties who succeed in securing a consci-
entious exemption should have their legal fees reimbursed, too, or at least that we 
should offer as much to those plaintiffs who can show financial hardship. If conscience is 
worth protecting, then we might not want the ability to pay to stand as a barrier to those 
with legitimate claims. 
 279 Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off the Wall (cited in note 43). 
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that Hobby Lobby’s claim deserved deference (it turned on moral 
and relational premises that courts may not challenge)280 and 
that granting the claim would not ultimately impose burdens on 
third parties, the Court was right to uphold Hobby Lobby’s  
exemption. 
But Hobby Lobby was unusual. We should expect that other 
cases will not involve a work-around that is so readily at hand. 
In these other cases, courts will have to do the serious work of 
weighing the religious adherent’s claim of complicity against the 
costs that an accommodation would impose on third parties. 
Again, just how much of a burden would be legitimate to impose 
on third parties is a matter for democratic deliberation. We can 
nonetheless anticipate the proper outcomes in a few discrete  
examples. 
Claims seeking religious exemptions from coverage for life-
saving measures (for example, blood transfusions) should be de-
nied, given the magnitude of the interests at stake for third par-
ties (here, life or death) unless the government can arrive at an 
alternative funding arrangement that leaves third parties no 
worse off. We should expect that claims seeking religious exemp-
tions from antidiscrimination laws would typically fail as well. 
The third parties whose interests are implicated in these cases 
are not only those who are immediately denied service or em-
ployment by the religious objector. All members of the group fac-
ing discrimination can claim an expressive injury from the dis-
crimination. And other historically oppressed groups can claim 
that an exemption threatens them with an injury, too: the state 
that would grant a request to discriminate fails to take seriously 
the great evil of discrimination and thus undermines the sense 
of security and respect that a decent state should confer on all 
its citizens.281 
 
 280 I have noted that Hobby Lobby’s claim rested on the dubious empirical assump-
tion that the four contested methods of contraception were “abortifacients.” See notes 
130–34 and accompanying text. If the medical community were certain that the four con-
traceptive methods never operated by destroying embryos, then the Court could have 
disposed of Hobby Lobby’s claim on empirical grounds, finding that it did not deserve 
any deference. But the medical community instead allows that there is at least a theoret-
ical possibility that the contraceptive methods in question work in just the way that 
Hobby Lobby fears. See notes 131–34. And because Hobby Lobby contends that it will 
feel itself to be complicit just so long as it contributes to conduct that has even a remote 
chance of leading to embryo destruction, the Court was right to treat its claim deferen-
tially, for the reasons advanced here. 
 281 Others who support gay rights have nonetheless been more hospitable to the idea 
that opponents of same-sex marriage should be permitted to abstain from contributing to 
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There will of course be cases far harder than these. But we 
should feel more confident in the ability of courts to appropriately 
assess claims of complicity once we appreciate the reasons for 
which these claims can be inherently compelling and once we 
expand the test for an accommodation so that it factors in the 
costs that an exemption would impose on third parties. 
CONCLUSION AND A PERSONAL APOLOGIA 
The freedom that we cherish and that our constitutional re-
gime enshrines is the freedom to create for ourselves lives of 
meaning and value.282 Conscience is central to that endeavor, 
and the law should then protect each of us from having to act 
against our consciences, at least when the protection can be had 
without imposing undue costs on others. Moreover, conscience is 
not an after-work or off-hours indulgence; indeed, only a cruel 
and unyielding conception of work would require that we turn 
our selves off during the time we spend on the job. It is for this 
reason that courts should treat requests for religious exemptions 
from specific provisions of the employer mandate with substan-
tial deference. 
With that said, I confess that the prospect that women’s 
sexual or reproductive choices might be anyone else’s business—
let alone a business’s business—is one that I find deeply discom-
fiting. I deplore efforts to limit women’s reproductive freedoms 
and construe many of these as reflections of a deep-seated sexism 
that no decent government should harbor or support. I have 
thus written in defense of women’s rights, including their repro-
ductive rights.283 And other pieces of my writing evince a deep 
 
gay or lesbian weddings. Thus, Professor Douglas Laycock would allow wedding vendors 
to deny service to gays and lesbians, just so long as the wedding vendors publicized their 
policies in advance. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. 
Picarello Jr, and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: 
Emerging Conflicts 189, 198–99 (Rowman & Littlefield 2008). Given the way in which 
the dignitary harm of a state-authorized denial of service can have ramifications for 
members of all historically oppressed groups, I am skeptical that we should allow these 
refusals. Their expressive implications arise not just in the face-to-face encounter in 
which the gay couple is turned away (an implication that Laycock’s account avoids in 
light of its publicity condition) but in the mere enjoyment of the state-sanctioned right to 
discriminate. See Koppelman, Gay Rights at 645–47 (cited in note 126). 
 282 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591, 593–94, 
619–25 (1982); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 Tex L Rev 175, 
176–81 (1982); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff 
204, 215–22 (1972). 
 283 See, for example, Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless “Others”, 
17 Yale J L & Feminism 327, 328 (2005) (arguing against the Unborn Victims of Violence 
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skepticism about corporate constitutional rights.284 My scholarly 
commitments are, then, such as to propel me toward the anti–
Hobby Lobby camp. More than that, as a woman of childbearing 
age who is perfectly happy with the family she has, challenges to 
the contraceptive mandate strike especially close to home.  
Hobby Lobby vexes me personally as much as it occupies me pro-
fessionally and politically. 
I offer these statements, unusual though they are in a law 
review publication, to shed some light on the internal struggle 
involved in advancing the thoughts contained here. Hobby  
Lobby, I have contended, was rightly decided, both as a matter 
of the doctrine as it stands and as a matter of the doctrine as it 
should be. More generally, as I have argued, claims of conscien-
tious objection warrant great (though not absolute) deference, 
even when they do not track the understanding of complicity in 
our standard legal and moral theories (as challenges to insur-
ance subsidization do not). I arrive at these claims in spite of my 
personal, ideological, and political orientation but, for all that, 
with no less conviction about their truth. If I do not relish the 
company of my bedfellows on these matters, I hope at least to 
take refuge in the fidelity to conscience that has compelled the 
reflections here. 
 
 
Act of 2004 and other legislative efforts aimed at fetal protection on the ground that they 
subordinate women). 
 284 See, for example, Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question 
of Corporate Citizenship, 44 Conn L Rev 575, 581 (2012) (asserting that corporations are 
not “normative citizens” and, as such, do not deserve the robust speech protections re-
cently bestowed on them by Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 
310 (2010)). 
